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The Shape of Things

HOW POIGNANT WAS THE FAILURE IN CHICAGO may be judged by the words with which President Roosevelt opened the Civil Aviation Conference: "As we begin to write a new chapter in the fundamental law of the air, let us all remember that we are engaged in a great attempt to build enduring institutions of peace." The rock upon which efforts to draft an effective international air-transport convention finally foundered was the divergence of American and British viewpoints on the powers to be intrusted to the international organization. To Mr. Berle the American position has been from the first: "You solve no problem of peace merely by delegation of naked power." To Lord Swinton it was: "The difference between a board with authority and a board having no authority is an absolutely fundamental difference." Smaller countries learned that deep American suspicion of an effective regulatory organization still prevents American collaboration in world affairs despite the precedent of the United Nations war effort, and that Britain will not easily tolerate an invasion of commerce in spheres it once dominated. How narrowly the conference missed success remains its secret. The Canadian proposal to regulate escalation of operating capacity on international air lines at one stage seemed adequate to bridge differences. Many delegates shared the British view that a universal formula is impracticable, that an international council should apply regulation in the best public interest in each route or region. The enforcement device in which responsibility rests with individual states would appear to overcome objections to delegating sovereign power. But what was finally irreconcilable was the clash of economic interests, and though the door is open for agreement on air-transport principles in future years, the freedom of the air was lost on that issue.

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THE NEW LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN the United States and Great Britain represents an encouraging step in constructive post-war planning. Its benefits are three-fold. The continuation of aid to Britain after the defeat of Germany assures the maximum possible military contribution on the part of Britain in the struggle against Japan. It protects American manufacturers and raw-material producers against a sudden termination of the demand for American supplies. And, even more important, it provides a means for restoring the world's economic equilibrium by giving Britain an opportunity to rehabilitate its export industries. During the war the great industries on which Britain's existence depends have been almost entirely converted to the production of munitions. Unable to maintain its exports, the nation has been forced to depend on lend-

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lease for essential food and raw materials. Under the new agreement this assistance will be curtailed, but the limitations on Britain's export industries will be relaxed at the same rate at which reconversion is permitted in this country. It is to be hoped that the Anglo-American agreement will be followed by similar arrangements with our other allies, permitting them to share in the benefits of sound planning for the difficult reconversion period.

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THE STORY OF BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE war, as summarized in an official White Paper, deserves close study by every American. It is a record of service, deprivation, and achievement that can be matched by no other Allied country, save possibly the Soviet Union. The extent to which the war dominates all else may be seen by the fact that almost half of British women are in the armed services, full-time civil defense, or industry. A half-million are enrolled in the auxiliary services alone. The cost of the war in tangible living standards may be seen not only in the fact that one out of three houses has been destroyed or damaged by enemy action but in the cutting of imports of food and raw materials, as a result of the shortage of ships, to less than half of the pre-war levels. The reduction in the imports of feed has led to a sharp curtailment in the number of sheep, pigs, and poultry, while the fish catch has been cut to one-third. Yet in the face of the constant drain of men and women into the armed services, the losses incurred from air raids, and the reduction in imports, Britain more than doubled its aircraft production between 1940 and 1944, and increased the bomb-load capacity of its bomber output tenfold. Ship production was boosted by more than 50 per cent; the output of naval guns rose fifteen-fold. And with sharply reduced man-power in agriculture, the output of wheat, barley, and potatoes was more than doubled, thus making up in part for the decline in imports. Nor is there any indication that Britain is letting down. The number of men and women in the armed services and the output of munitions and vital war supplies continue to rise in the sixth year of the conflict.

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A PROPOSAL THAT NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR be given an opportunity for education in the ideals of democracy has been rejected by Secretary Stimson on the ground that it would be met by "suspicion, hostility, and resistance" and thus defeat the purpose of the experiment. The objection would seem to be a valid one if compulsory indoctrination had been suggested. But the Harvard group which advanced the proposal had no such thought in mind. They suggested merely that lectures and discussions be made available to prisoners who wished to attend, and that books and other reading matter presenting the democratic point of view be placed within the prison camps. They also asked that German-speaking Americans specially trained to cope with the Nazi ideology be assigned to the camps. Mr. Stimson is undoubtedly speaking with a full knowledge of the facts when he insists that we do not have enough trained men to spare for such an undertaking. But it is only fair to ask why we have not made preparations for a voluntary reeducation of our half-million German prisoners. The opportunity for reaching such a large sector of the German population would seem too good to miss. Admittedly there are many Nazis who would resist such training no matter how it was presented. Yet most reports indicate that these are a small minority among the prisoners. Most of the others have been so indoctrinated with Nazi views that their reeducation presents difficulties. But with the future peace of the world at stake, we should not hesitate to throw the best educational resources of the country into the effort to counteract Herr Goebbels's poison.

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THE MASS SEDITION TRIAL HAS SEEMINGLY COME to an end as the result of the death of Justice Edward Eicher. Although there is still a slight possibility that some way will be found to continue the trial with another judge, the chances of salvaging the case are slim. And if a mistrial is declared, there appears to be even less chance that the government will undertake a new trial. With the knowledge that the defense has gained of the government's strategy, at least a year would be required before the trial could again be brought to its present stage. Although the antics of the defendants had made the trial little more than a farce, its complete abandonment on a technicality would only play into the hands of our domestic fascists. But instead of attempting to convict twenty-six ill-assorted crackpots in one trial, and thus encouraging delaying tactics by the defendants, the government would do well to prosecute the most dangerous of the defendants individually and make sure that they at least are put where they can do no further harm.

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STACY MAY AND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association have performed a public service by their able and comprehensive report on America's New Opportunities in World Trade. Those opportunities can only be realized if both capital and labor in this country are prepared to recognize that we are now the world's leading creditor nation and must act accordingly. We must sell abroad more than ever before if we are to achieve full employment, and to sell abroad we must be prepared to buy abroad. Our tariff barriers are still among the world's highest and must be reduced if the volume of trade is to be increased. This means that certain high-cost, essentially artificial American industries will have to give up a protection that is economically indefensible. When we speak here of high costs we do not mean high wages. The committee makes it clear that high wages generally reflect a high productivity that makes for lower costs in the United States than in countries enjoying the supposed blessings of that old labor bogyman "cheap foreign labor."

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TARIFF REDUCTION IS THE LONG-RANGE PROBlem. The more immediate one is an increased export of American capital for reconstruction once the war is over. We need export markets for goods and capital; foreign countries need both the goods and loans with which to pay

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for them. "Unless the United States," the National Planning Association report says, "meets this need for capital, war damage will be restored at the cost of severely depressed living standards." And depressed living standards abroad mean shrunken markets for our goods. This, like the tariff problem, requires a more enlightened attitude on the part of the American public, a little more education in basic economics. This is what Stacy May and his colleagues have so admirably supplied. Of fundamental importance is an understanding of the fact that to industrialize other countries does not restrict our own markets but expands them. "As a country is industrialized," the report admits, "it produces a greater proportion of its own manufactured goods and imports a decreasing proportion; but at the same time it is likely to expand the absolute volume of its imports, including its imports of finished manufactures."

Millionaires' Club

THE NATION appreciates the political difficulties which confront the President in his effort to achieve a stable peace. It understands that the peace cannot be cut to fit the pattern of any faction. It realizes that a coalition with certain forces on the right is essential if the peace is to command the necessary two-thirds' vote in the Senate. In this spirit, *The Nation* had hoped that Mr. Hull might continue to serve as Secretary of State until a permanent United Nations organization had been established. And in this spirit, it was prepared to accept the nomination of Mr. Stettinius as his successor. But *The Nation* is not prepared to look on silently while the State Department is turned into a millionaires' club.

Mr. Hull was a cantankerous old man of limited vision and undemocratic instincts who never had the courage to do anything in time about the Axis dangers he later claimed to have foreseen. But he did carry weight in the Senate. He was the idol of the Southern conservatives. He had the Republicans securely committed to him. And his sincere desire for a stable peace could not be denied. We were prepared to swallow much for the sake of his co operation in the framing of the peace. His successor, Mr. Stettinius, is a more agreeable figure, but he counts for less politically. He inherited wealth and position in the world of wealth but must rate as mediocre in knowledge and ability. His record is undistinguished, and his principal characteristic, under a pleasant and affable manner, is a susceptibility to the ideas of whatever men surround him. At the Defense Commission, in one environment, he was a standard-type dollar-a-year man. In the Lend-Lease Administration, whence he was finally kicked upstairs, he found himself in a different environment; many youthful idealists and New Dealers served under him, and he took on some of their color. As a concession to the right, he is palatable, for he is a man of good-will. But as the head of a State Department in which the top positions are all to go to the right, Mr. Stettinius is a good deal more than we bargained for.

Under cover of Mr. Hull's retirement and a supposed reorganization of the State Department for the sake of efficiency, an extraordinary plot—it is hard to apply a more moderate term—is taking shape in Washington. The State Department is planning to take over the work of the Foreign Economic Administration, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the commercial services so long performed abroad by the Department of Commerce. The purpose is a twofold one—to strengthen the Department of State's power and to weaken that of the Department of Commerce. The latter end is desired because Jesse Jones is at last reported ready to retire and Vice-President Wallace has been offered the Secretaryship of Commerce. A combination of the Baruch-Byrnes rightists and certain anti-Wallace White House liberals seems to have been formed to make the Commerce post unattractive to Wallace by shearing it of much of its potentialities.

CO-OPERATION CONUNDRUM

The plan is to place the activities of the Foreign Economic Administration in the State Department and under Jesse Jones's associate, Will Clayton, as Assistant Secretary. The activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American affairs are also to be placed in the State Department under Nelson A. Rockefeller as Assistant Secretary in charge of Latin American affairs; like Stettinius, Rockefeller may be expected to be much less liberal within the confines of State than he was when operating on his own. Leon Fraser, a leading Wall Street figure, now president of First National Bank, formerly president of that Axis favorite the Bank for International Settlements, is slated for the post of Assistant Secretary in charge of international finance. Jimmy Dunn, one of Franco's foremost friends in the Department, is reported in line for another Assistant Secretaryship, in charge of European

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affairs; and Joseph Grew is said to be the choice for Under Secretary. If only some way could be found to make a place in this constellation for John Foster Dulles, Wall Street would have no cause to regret the failure to elect Dewey.

The Nation calls on labor and progressives generally to make their protests heard at the White House before this reactionary cabal in the field of foreign affairs can succeed.

Mr. Stettinius, with a few progressives around him, would give a good account of himself. Mr. Stettinius, amid the encircling band of Clayton, Fraser, and Dunn, would be a naive and unresisting tool of reaction. All three of these men—Clayton, Fraser, and Dunn—are far better suited to the world of appeasement and collaboration with the Axis, as their pre-war records indicate, than to a world that can achieve stability only through sincere cooperation between the democratic powers and the Soviet Union. A State Department of this kind would be a calamity, not a compromise.

Power Politics in Italy

BRITISH policy is fast turning this war for democracy into a war for reaction. One day we see it at work in Belgium, where the British have put their army at the disposal of the unpopular Pierlot government; the next day in Greece, where a dozen followers of the E. A. M. (National Liberation Front) lost their lives in a demonstration against the order issued by the British commander, Lieutenant General Ronald M. Scobie, disbanding Greek guerrilla forces. Six E. A. M. ministers had already quit the Papandreou Cabinet in protest.

And then the same policy emerges in Italy, where the behavior of the British, even had there been no precedent for it, would be enough to discredit the entire political program of the Allies. The statement of the British ambassador in Rome, vetoing Count Sforza for the post of Premier or Foreign Minister in a new Italian government, tells the whole story of British intentions in those parts of Europe under their influence. Nothing Mr. Eden said in the House of Commons in his attempt to justify British intervention has made that story more hopeful for the future of a democratic world.

Sir Noel Charles blackballed Count Sforza because he considered him politically "unreliable," and that word was defined to mean that Sforza had promised, when he received permission to return to Italy, to support the House of Savoy but had later shifted to an anti-monarchist position.

Let us consider the implications of Sir Noel's statement. First, it reveals, without any attempt at dissembling, that Great Britain has taken over political control in Italy. Discussing the veto of Sforza in the New York *Times*, Herbert L. Matthews argues that since under the terms of the armistice "the Allies have the right to pass on Italian governmental nominations," there is nothing the political parties or the Committee of National Liberation can do "but accept the British decision." But this is the first word Americans have had that the British and "the Allies" in Italy are identical. If a prospective Italian Prime Minister is vetoed by "the Allies," one would expect some official inter-Allied body to take the responsibility. But no. The United States is maintaining a "strictly hands-off policy," as an Associated Press dispatch put it. Not "the Allies," not the Advisory Council, not the Allied Commission, but the British ambassador alone decides who is and who is not to head the Italian government. Here is "sphere-of-influence" politics played without even a pretense of Allied cooperation.

A second point should be noted. Count Sforza lived in the United States, and arrangements for his return were made through the State Department. Although his record and opinions were well known—he had expressed them frequently in *The Nation* and in other publications here—he undoubtedly had to make certain promises to this government before receiving his passport. And since Britain and the United States are supposed to be jointly responsible for the fate of Italy, it might be assumed that the British had also to be convinced that Count Sforza would not make trouble when he arrived in Italy. But surely the State Department, on its own initiative, would hardly have exacted from Sforza a promise that he would support the Italian monarchy! That would be going a little too far for even a conservative agency of this republican government. We can only conclude that such a promise, if Sforza really made it, was demanded by the British and that the State Department, as so often in the past, yielded to their request.

A third point emerges. Suppose we grant that Count Sforza accepted the conditions laid down. Let us go farther and assume that he intended to support the House of Savoy. Certainly his actions when he arrived in Italy would favor such an assumption. Recognizing the disrepute into which the King and the Crown Prince had fallen through their long collaboration with Mussolini, Sforza made the proposal that a regency be established until the King's young grandson should come of age. Thus he tried to guarantee the principles of monarchy and "legitimacy" so dear to the British Tories and, at the same time, to open the way for the formation of a government free from fascist left-overs. It was ingenious, but a bit slick for a people which, for twenty years, had been suffering under a fascist regime blessed by the House of Savoy. Under the inexorable pressure of popular feeling Sforza abandoned his plan.

To accuse Count Sforza of political "unreliability" because he changed his position on this question is like criticizing a man for not maintaining his dignity and balance when he is swept off a rock by a cataract. What the British are really trying to do is to prevent the democratic groups from forming a strong government. We do not pretend that a strong government could be easily achieved. In a country only half liberated, suffering from hunger and the total disruption of its economic life, the reconstruction of a stable political order would be difficult in any case. But the task becomes impossible when the power of "liberating" nations is exercised against the will of the people.

In this dangerous situation the United States is playing an ambiguous role. American soldiers are dying in the mountains of Italy. Americans share with the British the responsibility for controlling the liberated areas. We have no right either to abandon the purposes for which we have pledged the lives of Americans or to surrender our share of authority

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in the conduct of affairs behind the lines. The Sforza incident is bad enough in itself. It is worse for what it reveals of both British and American policy.

Keeping China in the War

THE gravity of events in China, with Japan's armies menacing Kweiyang and gathering strength for an all-out assault against Chungking, caused *The Nation* to ask Maxwell Stewart and Kate Mitchell—both close students of present-day China—to set forth the main factors in a highly complex situation. Mr. Stewart's article was published on November 25; Miss Mitchell's appears in this issue.

From their objective study it is evident that the all too prevalent view that China had better be written off as a factor in the Far Eastern war must be rejected. The defeat of China would be tragic. It would delay our victory, make it extremely difficult to establish a mainland base against the well-organized and well-supplied enemy, and, in the end, add enormously to our expenditure of men. Beyond these considerations, it is hard to think of a stable peace in the Far East without a strong and united China.

Japan, perfectly aware of what it stands to gain, is pressing home its present advantage. Japan counts on two likely developments: the disintegration of the Chinese armies, and an increasing pressure for a compromise peace from the reactionary Chungking elements who are now exploiting the alleged desertion of China by the Allies. Japanese armies and puppet governments control an area far greater than Free China. Free China is torn by bitter dissension. Japan has therefore considerable ground for believing that the opportunity is ripe for a knockout blow.

What can be done to save China and defend an all-important sector in our Pacific war? In material terms, the problem is one of increasing Chinese production of war materials and getting war materials into China from outside. Donald Nelson and his colleagues are doing their best to meet the first of these problems. But they cannot work miracles. The industrial production of Free China is pitifully small. No matter how brilliantly successful Nelson is in stepping up Chinese production, it cannot begin to supply a Chinese army capable of matching Japan's mainland armies. Moreover, the task of building communications and transportation systems so that the supplies can be got to where they are needed is tremendous.

The prospects of help from outside are more promising. But here, to date, the supplies from over the Hump and the additional supplies that may be brought in from India over the new Ledo road are utterly inadequate for any large-scale offensive. It is clear that some ports must be opened to bring in supplies by sea. This will not be an easy undertaking, with increased Japanese control over the coastal railways. But the desperate nature of the present situation makes it imperative for the Allies to convince the Chinese that they are not abandoned.

It will take the fullest utilization of China's military resources to beat Japan. One of our mistakes, as Miss Mitchell points out, has been to consider that only the Kuomintang armies under General Chiang Kai-shek should receive supplies. When we open new ports we must see that arms get to all China's armies—government and guerrilla alike—so long as those arms are used against Japan.

This brings us to the critical question of Chinese unity. It is quite evident that Chiang Kai-shek is still China's key leader. He is a symbol of China's national life. He is universally respected, even by the Communists. It would be unrealistic to suggest that American support should be shifted from him to the Communist regime in the north. But to say that we consider Chiang important does not mean that we should allow the present intolerable situation to continue. We cannot permit the course of the war to be determined by the reactionary landlords and bankers and feudal war lords who today appear to hold Chiang captive. No important problem in China can be dealt with—be it industrial production, army mobilization, military training, or national solidarity—while the present reactionary clique in Chungking is in power. The blight which this clique is bringing on the whole of Chinese life is to be seen in the government's education policy, concerning which *The Nation* will shortly publish an article by an eminent Chinese scholar.

The recent Cabinet shift indicated that some improvements were being made. The appointment of General Chen Cheng as Minister of War has already greatly improved the cooperation between the Chinese and American military leaders. The replacement of H. H. Kung by his brother-in-law, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, as vice-president of the Yuan brings to the Generalissimo's right hand one who is popular throughout China, is known to have moderate political views on the subject of cooperation with the Communists, and commands great respect in Washington. Support should be given to Chiang in eliminating the worst, reactionary elements that unfortunately still are strongly intrenched in his Cabinet and replacing them by some of the Communist leaders. A political rapprochement between Chungking and the Communists is absolutely essential. The Communists must be accorded control over the territory they now dominate. The reforms they have introduced must be allowed to stand. Moreover, some of the same land reforms should be applied throughout China. For the feudal and agriculturally backward character of Free China is an important factor in holding back the entire Chinese war effort.

The achievement of political and economic unity would make possible a united military effort under the direction of American and British advisers who have knowledge of China, command the trust of the Chinese, and know the use of modern weapons. Only through this sort of cooperation, rapidly achieved, can China be kept in the war and its future status as one of the major powers be secured.

IN A FORTHCOMING ISSUE OF *THE NATION*

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Oscar Lange, "A Solution for Germany." A challenging article taking issue with The Nation's *position on the treatment of Germany after the war.*

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The War Fronts

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

FASHIONS in military thought—especially, popular military thought—change hardly at all between wars, but in wars they change fast and usually erratically. Before the last war, for instance, military thought was centered on the offense, which was conceived of as being sudden, decisive, and irresistible. But war-time experience demonstrated that the machine-gun increased defensive firepower and thus the efficacy of the defense tenfold; so military thought after the war took a violent turn toward the defensive obsession. Of course this was most pronounced in the victorious nations, whose general staffs throughout history have ordinarily prepared for the next war by fighting the last war's battles over again. The general staffs of defeated nations have naturally been more anxious to discover why they were defeated and how to avoid defeat the next time; so they have usually produced the new doctrine which leads to another shift in fashionable military thinking.

The German General Staff, that inventive body, did so with a vengeance after 1918, and in this war the emphasis in military thought has again been on the offense. The offense achieved spectacular success from 1939 to 1942, when the defense caught up. The offensive idea failed the Germans at Stalingrad and Alamein not merely because they overreached themselves, or outran their supply lines, or arrayed too many troops against themselves, or alienated God—all of which they admittedly and most certainly did—but also because the Allied thinkers found defensive answers to the German offensive threat. The Red Army learned how to detach sizable forces and withdraw them in good order to new defensive positions, from which they exacted new tolls of the advancing enemy; the British Desert Army learned how to deploy large numbers of anti-tank guns and how to use them in connection with mine fields, artillery concentrations, and mutually supporting strong points having interlocking fields of fire. Both armies learned to let tanks through on certain occasions, with the infantry lying low and then popping up to repel the enemy's infantry following the tanks; both learned the tactical use of air power in the best tradition of defensive warfare—to defend by attacking the enemy and destroying or dispersing his strength.

The Allies then went over to the offensive, having learned much from the Germans, and the Germans went on the defensive, adding some new tricks to demonstrate their annoying skill at tactical improvisation. But the effective utilization of overmastering strength by the Allies was too potent to be met by even the most skilful tactical improvisation; the essential strategic bankruptcy of the German position could not be corrected except by general and costly retreat, and could then be corrected only temporarily; so the offense continued in the ascendancy. The tremendous summer advance of the Red Army, the successful landings in Normandy, and the sensational pursuit across France to the German border, all served to strengthen popular belief in the irresistible nature of the offense.

And then? Comes a halt, comes gloom. When the Russian offensive collided with an effective German defense, there rose murmurs of "politics" and "selling out the Poles." When the Anglo-American offensive collided with an effective German defense, there rose lengthy explanations of "over-extended supply lines" and "lack of deep-water ports." Fashionable military thinking was at one of its extremes.

Now—to come to the point of this sermon—this is nonsense. There is no such thing as an absolute in military affairs. The offense is always outstripping the defense, and the defense is always catching up, until the offense outstrips it again. It took three years of war for the Allied defense to catch up to the German offense, which exhausted itself strategically and was countered tactically at about the same time, by blessed coincidence. In the subsequent two years the Allied counter-offense has gained what is without question an eventually irresistible *strategic* momentum—that is, the question of who will win the European war is no longer in doubt; but the German counter-defense has gained a temporary *tactical* stabilization—that is, the question how long the European war will last is still in considerable doubt.

The Germans withdrew with much skill in east and west until they reached the point where they could no longer afford to withdraw, for strategic reasons: beyond the Vistula and the East Prussian defense belt, as beyond the Roer and the Westwall, lie absolutely vital areas of the Reich. At the same time German defensive capabilities and tactics were brought into balance with Allied offensive capabilities and tactics.

Such a temporary balance will often be reached, even in the best-run and most optimistic of wars. The Italian campaign is a glaring example, as Mr. Sevareid accurately demonstrates elsewhere in this issue: in this case I believe the supreme Anglo-American command, not the local commanders, played into the enemy's hands by pushing the campaign unnecessarily beyond Rome, whose liberation was a political victory the importance of which Mr. Sevareid perhaps underestimates. The recent balance on the western front is a more nearly average example, serving to emphasize the fact that continual experimentation and improvisation are fundamental to maintaining the pace of the offensive.

Even these steps will not necessarily produce a perpetual advance, especially after the enemy has had some years of practice in war. The tank can now be countered by the anti-tank gun; and a densely built-up area such as that between Aachen and the Rhine is a natural series of obstacles in which every village performs an anti-tank function. Mine fields, barbed-wire entanglements, concrete pillboxes, and field fortifications—trenches, earthworks, and fire points—must all be reduced by a most careful coordination of artillery, infantry, armor, and close air support. Add to this the enemy's exceptional skill in the use of defensive fire-power, from deceptively placed artillery batteries down to concentrated mortar and machine-gun groupings, his resourceful employment of numerically inferior but qualitatively superior tanks, and the tenacious resistance of his best front-line troops, and the result is a slow and costly advance for the attacker—until the temporary defensive advantage is submerged by the overriding strategic advantage of being on the offensive and holding the initiative. Then the shape of battle changes very quickly again.

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Littell Versus Biddle

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, December 1

AT BEST, the information so far available in the Biddle-Littell feud makes the Attorney General seem small and petulant. At worst, it makes his ex-Assistant Attorney General seem arrogantly self-righteous. That Assistant Attorney General Norman Littell despised Attorney General Francis Biddle and that Attorney General Francis Biddle disliked Assistant Attorney General Norman Littell intensely was no secret. It could have been no surprise to Littell when Biddle asked for his resignation on November 18, and it was no surprise to those who knew Littell to learn that he had declined to resign. As an Assistant Attorney General he was removable only by the President, and the President has now regretfully removed him, telling Biddle that he thought he had handled the matter badly.

Incompatibility is obvious, but the Biddle-Littell affair cannot be dismissed as merely a clash of personalities. Assistant Attorney General Littell's courageous testimony before Congressional investigating committees in the past two years was primarily responsible for two major progressive victories. One was the cancelation of the contract between the Navy Department and Standard Oil of California for the exploitation of the Elk Hills naval petroleum reserve. The other was the complete revision and liberalization in the Senate of the original Clayton bill for the disposal of war surpluses. Littell's disclosures to the Truman committee last August 17 not only wrecked the Clayton bill, after it had passed the House, but played a large part recently in preventing the appointment of a Surplus Property Board dominated by underlings of Clayton and Jesse Jones.

Biddle's request for Littell's resignation came just when Jones and Clayton and Byrnes were smarting over the successful Senate revolt against their hand-picked Surplus Property Board. That revolt stemmed in part from Littell's testimony, and it looked as if Littell were being punished for his plain speaking. The Truman committee, before which Littell had testified, asked both officials for an explanation. This was the least the committee could do. But even this little seems to have been done only under pressure from Senators Kilgore and Ferguson, the former acting from a sickbed. Not the least important aspect of this case is its effect on officials asked to testify before Congressional investigating committees. Whatever the truth of the matter, even the better than average official is likely to conclude from the Littell affair that investigating committees cannot be depended upon to protect witnesses who get in wrong with their superiors by testifying honestly.

The Attorney General owed it to himself and to the public to dispel that impression. His opportunity came when Senator Mead, Truman's successor as head of the "Truman committee," asked him to present a statement. Biddle simply denied that he had asked for Littell's resignation "in order to discipline him for testifying before your committee," and said he had never objected to Littell's testifying before any Congressional committee. The Attorney General said he thought it "inappropriate" for him to enter into the details which led him to ask for Mr. Littell's resignation except to say that for some time their "relationship had been such that [I] no longer reposed in him the kind of confidence that was essential for the best interests of the department." This is not adequate. Littell sent the committee a copy of memorandum he wrote last August 21 to Acting Attorney General Charles Fahy dealing with a "severe reprimand" administered Littell by Fahy on Biddle's instructions the morning after the surplus-property testimony. If Biddle did not object to the testimony, why was Littell reprimanded for giving it? Biddle's press representative said yesterday that the Attorney General "heartily concurred" with Littell's testimony but that there was a "mixup" about what Littell intended to tell the committee, that Biddle thought he was only going to testify about some amendment to the Surplus Property bill. The reprimand itself was not denied. If Biddle heartily concurred, why did he object to Littell's saying it?

In addition to submitting a copy of the memorandum to Fahy, Littell replied to Senator Mead's request with a twenty-six-page statement on the issues between himself and Biddle. After Senator Mead made both the Littell and Biddle communications public, the Attorney General issued a short press release saying that he did "not propose to discuss Mr. Littell's reckless and unfounded statement" and that he would not "tolerate such serious disloyalty or insubordination from any member of the department even if he thinks it is his public duty to remain in office after he has been asked to resign." This was as close as Biddle has yet come to a bill of particulars. These two statements and some explanations volunteered by his press representative yesterday are all we have on Biddle's side of the story. The rest is Littell's, and one would think Biddle would welcome a chance to answer it. Littell's circumstantial account does not picture Biddle as a wicked man, but it does portray him as weak, fuzzy-minded, and not disposed to stick his neck out on dangerous issues. Few informed observers will find this view of the Attorney General startling. In justice to Biddle, it must be added that Littell's epistle to the Truman committee also paints an involuntary picture of himself, and that Littell clearly is no model of modesty or tact.

It would take a Gogol to do justice to the wars of Biddle with Littell, and one suspects that occasionally trouble between them arose because it is difficult for two officials to occupy the same headline at the same time. Thus the Attorney General, according to Littell's account, was all ready to write "a blistering memorandum" on the Elk Hills contract until his assistant got to a witness stand on Capitol Hill ahead of him. But the story seems less funny when one begins to examine the implications of some of these incidents. Littell said his relations with Biddle began to deteriorate when the Attorney General asked him to agree to a settlement in the condemnation case of *United States* vs. *Savannah*

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Shipyards, a subsidiary of Empire Ordnance, which was represented by Biddle's friend and political mentor, Tom Corcoran. If the detailed story given by Littell is correct, it supports the prevalent impression that Corcoran, now a private counsel often engaged in litigation with the government, enjoys a close intimacy with the Attorney General.

There are more admirable qualities than tact in public office. Had Littell been tactful, he would have taken the hint from Biddle at the beginning. Littell tells of a series of attempts to make him accept a settlement and says he finally told the Attorney General "very plainly that because of his intimate connection with Tommy Corcoran, a settlement by him at anything above the government's figure of $985,665 would break wide open into a public scandal." Littell declares that Biddle finally turned to his assistant, Jim Rowe, another Corcoran protégé, and "said that I was right, 'It would be another Sterling Products case.'" According to Littell, the owners originally asked $2,187,000. Their counsel talked of $1,900,000. On the eve of the trial they offered settlement at $1,085,000, and the trial ended with a jury verdict of $1,285,000. The only comment by Biddle's press man on this whole affair was that the jury verdict was "$200,000 more" than the settlement offered and this proved "Corcoran's people were not trying to rob the country blind." That is hardly the point.

Littell says that some time after the Savannah case Rowe sent the Attorney General a memorandum saying that Marquis Childs had reported to an SEC lawyer that Littell had said at a dinner party (the Attorney General's entourage seems to collect tittle-tattle of this kind) that when the SEC report on the Empire Ordnance Company "was turned over to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution, it would be suppressed." Littell declares that Biddle worked himself into quite a lather over this, though Childs denied that he had ever said any such thing. Childs supported Littell's version of this affair when I checked it with him. Whatever was said, it would be instructive for a Congressional committee to find out just what did happen to this case. It was prepared by the SEC and handed over to the United States Attorney's office in New York for prosecution, where it seems to have fizzled out. Why?

I should think a Congressional committee would want the answers to many of the questions raised by Littell's account of the differences between him and Biddle. Why, for example, did the Attorney General give a copy of Littell's report on the Elk Hills contract to counsel for Standard Oil of California when he had forbidden Littell to give a copy to the House Public Lands Committee? Why did Biddle try to keep the Truman committee from getting a copy of Littell's report on the Breakers Hotel at Palm Beach? What is the extent of Corcoran's influence with Biddle, and what part did it play in the settlement of the Sterling Products case?

The Biddle-Littell dispute is more than a conflict of personalities. It involves the question of justice for an able and conspicuously independent public servant summarily removed from office. It raises the question of whether he was punished by the Attorney General for his outspoken testimony in the Elk Hills, Breakers Hotel, and surplus-property inquiries and the further question of whether Congressional investigating committees are prepared to protect public officials who testified before them. Answers to these questions would throw a good deal of light on the inner workings of the Department of Justice and its chief.

What to Do About China

BY KATE L. MITCHELL

OUR relations with China are in many respects one of the most important problems facing us in the immediate future and also in the post-war period. This is true not only because China will presumably be the decisive battleground in the war against Japan but also because American hopes for future peace and prosperity depend to a very great extent upon the emergence of a prosperous, stable, and independent China. It is natural, therefore, that the American people have felt deep concern over the continuing economic and political crisis in China—a concern that some have mistaken for an unwarranted interference in Chinese affairs. The recall of General Stilwell brought to a head the mounting bitterness and resentment of Chinese officials, and of certain groups in the United States, against what they consider attempts by Washington to "dictate" to the Chinese government. The champions of Chungking contend that the Chinese people have fought against Japan much longer than has any other country, that in the course of this devastating struggle China has inevitably been greatly weakened, and that today, when China is weak "through no fault of its own," the American government fails to remember its past sacrifices.

This interpretation of the history of the past eight years is erroneous. It is true that from 1937 to 1940 the United States, though friendly and sympathetic toward China, gave it only the most nominal aid and was furthermore responsible, in large measure, for enabling Japan to build up a powerful war machine. But during the years since Pearl Harbor the traditional friendship of the American people for China has unquestionably crystallized into a definite recognition not only that a strong and independent China would be the best guaranty of future peace in the Far East but also that China's ability to expand its economy and raise the living standards of its people has a direct bearing on our own ability to maintain and improve our people's standards of living. If American criticism of China has been severe, this has been due chiefly to our disappointment at Chungking's failure to halt a trend that is rapidly converting China from an asset to a liability, not only for the war but also for the crucial years to follow. The American people are justifiably disturbed that

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while everywhere else among the United Nations there is increasing unity, China shows the opposite tendency.

Those who resent all American criticism of the situation in China are not doing either China or the United States any good. In their unqualified championing of Chungking's cause they seem unable to recognize the far-reaching changes produced by the war years or the powerful new forces that have arisen. Preoccupation with China's achievements of yesterday is no substitute for action and progress today.

In *The Nation* of November 25 Maxwell Stewart posed the question of what policy the United States should pursue to establish a workable basis of cooperation with China. It is obvious that this problem has two phases. One is how we can win the war against Japan as quickly as possible and with the least loss of life; the other is how we can best help China to become a nation strong enough to take its place as one of the Big Four and not merely as an appendage to the Big Three. The two, of course, are closely connected, since the effectiveness of Chinese participation in the war will have a direct bearing on China's future unity and strength. If, for example, Japan is defeated chiefly by American military and naval power without the active aid of China's armed forces, there is grave danger that China will enter the period of peace-making too weak militarily to be a powerful political factor, and that this weakness will play into the hands of those who wish to restore the pre-war balance of power in the Far East. The case of France is a notable example of the close relation between military and political effectiveness. While the Vichy government under Pétain and Laval was collaborating with Nazi Germany, France was disregarded as a political power in Europe. But when the Allies landed in Normandy, the powerful French resistance movement, which gave invaluable aid to the invading armies, quickly won for France the position of a highly respected partner. The French armies are taking an important part in the final offensive against Germany, and there is no doubt that France will have an influential voice in the peace conferences.

China could learn a useful lesson from the experience of France, and it is clear that the United States is eager to help China to attain the unity and military strength that are essential if it is to play a leading political role in the Far East now and later. Unfortunately, however, the Central Government armies have deteriorated as a fighting force until they are almost valueless. Donald Nelson and General Hurley are doing everything they can to aid the reorganization of China's military and economic structure so that the Chinese armies can once again become the effective fighting force they were in 1938 and 1939. And although the recent Cabinet shifts in Chungking represented no radical change in the political structure of Kuomintang China, the appointment of the very able, popular, and liberal General Chen Cheng to the post of War Minister seems likely to lead to closer cooperation between Chinese and American military leaders. On the military front, therefore, we may see an important change for the better.

The fact remains, however, that when American troops land on the shores of China, the Chungking government will have no control of the coast and no force there to help them. In those areas the only Chinese troops will be the guerrilla or partisan units. The situation will be in an important sense comparable to that in Yugoslavia when the partisans under Marshal Tito were the only force capable of giving effective military support to the Allies against Nazi Germany. In Yugoslavia's case military requirements eventually superseded political considerations, and Tito's partisans were recognized as valuable fighting allies whose aid could shorten the war. Similarly if the American troops can count on effective support from the Chinese guerrillas, the offensive against Japan will be facilitated and many lives will be saved. Thus there seems to be no question that the United States should treat the guerrillas as fighting allies operating in areas of great strategic importance. This would mean delivering American supplies to the guerrillas as well as to the Central Government troops, stationing American liaison officers at the main guerrilla headquarters, establishing one or more American consulates in the guerrilla regions, and making full use of the enormous amount of information regarding Japanese tactics that has been obtained by the Eighth Route Army and its partisan auxiliaries. In China as in Yugoslavia political considerations should not be allowed to outweigh military necessities when the lives of American soldiers are at stake.

There is, however, one big difference between the situation in China and that in Yugoslavia. Whereas General Mihailovich made deals with both camps, the Chungking government has never wavered in its devotion to the Allied cause. It is not necessary to choose *between* the Chinese guerrillas and the regular government troops. Rather, every American can hope that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Chen Cheng, Donald Nelson, and General Hurley will find ways and means of bringing the central armies of China to sufficient fighting strength to play a leading role in the large-scale land offensive which General Wedemeyer only the other day declared was essential for Japan's defeat.

Mr. Nelson is working hard to increase the volume of military supplies flown into China from 20,000 to 30,000 tons a month, and that immediately. He has also been authorized by Chiang Kai-shek to establish a Chinese War Production Board with the primary aim of bringing about the efficient utilization of China's existing industrial plants, which have been producing at only from 30 to 70 per cent of their capacity. Unquestionably, Mr. Nelson will encounter serious difficulties in his efforts to build up an efficient industrial organization in China; he has himself criticized the prevalent nepotism, bureaucratic corruption, and lack of interest in manufacturing induced by the far greater profits to be made from speculation in raw materials. He will of necessity have to work with Chinese officials who have been responsible for the very conditions that he is trying to eradicate. Much can be accomplished, however, if the American government is firmly insistent that Mr. Nelson be given real aid in eliminating the economic abuses that have so disastrously undermined China's fighting strength. If the volume of military supplies reaching China from India can be stepped up, if the available equipment is used exclusively to fight the Japanese, and if, in addition, China begins to make full use of its own industrial resources, there is no military reason why it cannot put into the field a sizable and adequately equipped army.

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Thus, so far as American policy toward China is concerned, it is not a question of aiding the Chinese guerrillas against the Kuomintang or of helping the Kuomintang armies to become strong enough to wipe out the guerrillas. Our primary aim is to win the war as quickly as possible, and to this end we should obviously seek to strengthen all sections of China's fighting forces and increase the general effectiveness of Chinese participation in the war. In that process we could do much to restore the remarkable unity that existed in China in the early years of the war. Furthermore, if Mr. Nelson and his colleagues are able to reorganize and expand Chinese industrial production, their success will contribute to a recovery of political power by the industrial and banking class, which Mr. Stewart described as "by and large progressive in the sense that it had a world view and wished to see China develop along the lines of the Western economic pattern"—an attitude in sharp contrast to the reactionary outlook of the landlord-moneylender group now dominant, which is chiefly concerned with preserving China's outmoded and oppressive agrarian system.

Any expansion of Chinese industry will inevitably help break the stranglehold of this landed-gentry class and thus enable China to achieve at least the beginnings of a better-balanced and potentially more prosperous economic structure. Such a development would also be of tremendous importance in lessening the tension between the Chungking bureaucracy and the guerrilla governments in the border regions, and between the Kuomintang and Communist parties, since it is the landed-gentry class that is most fearful of the agrarian reforms instituted in the guerrilla regions, and most determined to prevent them from spreading to Kuomintang China, even at the cost of civil war.

To return to the parallel of Yugoslavia: the final recognition of Marshal Tito's forces as a military partner of the Allies resulted not in revolution but in the establishment of a broadly representative government under King Peter and Premier Subasich. In China the prospects for a similar outcome are even better because Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is accepted as the supreme leader of China by every group from the Communists to the "old-style" war lords. Not one important movement to overthrow him is known to exist. The most radical demand made of him has been that he set up a representative coalition government under his leadership.

Recognition by Chiang Kai-shek that only through political unity can he remain the head of a strong and influential nation would go a long way toward ending the present political impasse in China and insuring effective cooperation between China and the United States. His alternative is to remain the leader of a China weakened by internal dissension. If Chiang chooses to retain a government composed of men preferring civil war to the relinquishment of their undemocratically acquired monopoly of power, it will be impossible for China to use its energies for reconstruction and economic progress.

The United States can make a great contribution to China, to itself, and to all the United Nations by giving all possible military aid to those forces in China that can be of most immediate help to us—namely, the Eighth Route Army and all the other guerrilla forces—while at the same time doing everything possible to encourage the rebirth of the central Chinese armies as an effective fighting force. Even though the formation of a representative coalition government does not appear to be an immediate possibility, the kind of military and economic cooperation involved in such a policy has within it the seeds of greater Chinese unity and would hasten the emergence of that strong, united, and independent China that all friends of the Chinese people so earnestly desire.

25 Years Ago in "The Nation"

JAPAN, IN ITS DEALINGS with China, continues to profess an unctuous altruism worthy of a Western power. . . . The Chinese people, meantime, appear somewhat unappreciative of Japanese solicitude for their welfare. Japan is widely believed to have spent a good deal of money in corrupting officials of the Chinese government, but it has succeeded in winning little more than hatred and suspicion from the Chinese population.—*December 6, 1919.*

MOST OF THE NEWSPAPERS that covered their front pages last summer with accounts of the raid on the Rand School in New York, and the proposal of the Lusk Committee to close the place and cancel the charter because of seditious activities, found no room to chronicle the collapse of the suit last week.—*December 6, 1919.*

NEITHER THE WICKEDNESS of Carranza nor the depravity of the Mexican nation but the policy of Wilson is the key to the Mexican situation. It is a policy, not of non-intervention, but of intervention. . . . I plead for the right of the Mexican government, undoubtedly supported in its policies by a majority of Mexicans, struggling toward democracy, honestly seeking to serve the Mexican people, to make such disposition as it sees fit of Mexican oil, regardless of the results to Wall Street.—JOHN KENNETH TURNER, *December 13, 1919.*

MR. FRANK L. POLK, the head of the American peace delegation at Paris, persists in taking a hopeful view of the world situation. "The laborious edifice of world peace," he is reported to have said in a public statement just before leaving for home, "is on the eve of achievement." We heartily wish that we could agree with him. . . . What makes such grandiloquent announcements as that of Mr. Polk the more distasteful is the fact that everybody now knows how great and dreadful the failure has been, and the reasons for it.—*December 20, 1919.*

AT FIRST SIGHT OR SOUND the Einstein controversy looks like an Irish quarrel: much din and fury but not necessarily much cause. Nor have most newspaper explanations thrown anything but shadows across the matter. What they agree in is that the new theory is too difficult to explain, if not too difficult to understand. . . . Actually, what has happened is that a certain margin of error in physics—a margin long known by physicists, mathematicians, psychologists, and metaphysicians to be in existence—has been apparently narrowed by Professor Einstein's discovery of a new and highly complex formula.—*December 27, 1919.*

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*Will It Be Peace?**

BY STUART CHASE

THE veterans will be coming back to Main Street to enjoy the peace. In fever-laden jungles and in the frozen North, at sea and in foxholes and in the thin high air, the men have dreamed of this return. They have dreamed of peace in pre-war images, and in images of a fantastic Utopia. What will they find?

Main Street will not look so different to them from its pre-war self, though their eyes will be sharp for changes. There is Ed's garage, and the First National Bank, and the Palace Theater, and a fine new coat of paint on the Methodist church. Terry's meat market has gone out of business, but there is a new grocery store by the traffic light. The union hall is filled with new members and confidence; the Grange has been painted up too and seems to be coming to life. The Chamber of Commerce is staging a big drive to keep the new war plant from closing down.

The town folks will go wild when the young men come back. They will put on a parade and a carnival, and fire off the Civil War cannon in Prospect Park, the way they did in 1918. Senator Williamson will make a speech about peace.

But will it be peace? Or will the war abroad give place to a decade of conflict at home? Will Main Street be the victim of a dangerous and bitter battle between warring pressure groups? Will Big Business, Big Labor, and Big Agriculture take up where the Germans and the Japanese left off?

Running Wild

Sometimes it almost seems so. It seemed so to Raymond Clapper just before he left on his fatal trip to the Pacific, when he wrote in his column:

> It is a sickening thing to see happening in war time, this greedy raid all around. American men are dying all over the world, and Washington is engulfed in an obscene grab for the almighty dollar. These pressure groups are running wild. Washington is being terrorized, and every politician is fleeing for his life to fall in with the demand to break up price control.

The Big Three—labor, farm, business—were the chief offenders on the price-control issue. Certain labor groups were trying to crack open the Little Steel formula and thus raise wages. Farm groups were trying to kill government subsidies and thus raise food prices. Business groups were trying to kill the tax bill, which was specially drawn to hold down inflation.

All this happened while the country was under fire. When victory is achieved and military patriotism is not a force—what then? That doubt was what made Raymond Clapper so bitter.

Why Nations Fall

Up to the time these words are written, in the autumn of 1944, it is significant to see which of the belligerent nations have held together under the pressure of war, and which have disintegrated. France and Italy crumbled early. Britain, Russia, Germany, and Japan have taken great punishment but maintained their morale.

What is the reason? Among the varying characteristics of these nations can we find a common factor of strength or weakness? It is not, I think, a question of nationality. Human beings are not so different the world around. All the men have twenty-eight chromosomes and all the women twenty-nine. The French are not less valorous than the Russians.

The ability to take it or to crack is tied up, I believe, with the way individuals feel about their country. Some folks are willing to make heavy sacrifices for their homeland, and others, just as courageous individually, are not. When the willing ones are in the majority, as in Britain or Russia, we find a nation extremely difficult to overthrow. When the willing ones are in the minority, the nation caves in.

France was cruelly split into many factions. Its government machinery was out of gear, with cabinets falling every other week. Communists, socialists, liberals, royalists, fascists, labor parties, big business, peasant blocs, rentiers, the "200 families," centrists, pro-Spanish Loyalists, were all at each other's throats. André Mesnard writes in the *New Republic:* "Perhaps the most shocking thing brought to light by the defeat of 1940 was the bankruptcy of the élite whose task it was to unite the nation morally. When the crisis came, it was discovered that Frenchmen, in key positions, thought not as citizens of France but as members of groups."

We do not know so much about pre-war opposition groups in Italy, but they are blossoming now, in many colors, in Naples and Rome. Did Poland and Yugoslavia fail to put up a strong fight because they were torn by racial minorities?

On the Home Front

Now let us swing the pointer inward. Will the people of the United States stand firm when the test comes? The test here will spring from the aftermath of war, not from the war itself. We shall not be tried in the fires of invasion and mass bombing but in the fires of demobilization and unemployment. We shall be tested for our ability to forge a durable peace.

We are a people with many freedoms, and we glory in them. Are we so free that we lack the cement which holds a nation together in crisis? To hear us talk one would think that we could stand up to anything. The French used to talk like that too. How much of a country are we anyway? How strong is the Main Street pattern? We are going to find out before long. The furnace is being prepared and the temperature will be high. We cannot hire smart publicity men to fake our way through it. We shall have to march through it.

Taking and Giving

For three hundred years Americans have been taking from their land and natural resources without giving an equivalent back. Now almost half our arable land has been damaged or

* This is a chapter from Mr. Chase's forthcoming book, "Democracy Under Pressure," which is being published as a report to the Twentieth Century Fund. Two other chapters will appear in early issues.

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destroyed by erosion. Too many of us have thought of our country as something to be mined and exploited, not something to be loved and maintained. The people who now go to black markets with a knowing wink are carrying on the same tradition. Not only individuals but powerful groups have been operating on what might be called the Me First principle. Their eyes have not been seeing America as a whole. When they have had to choose between behaving like Americans or behaving like, say, coal miners or steel men, they have behaved like coal miners or steel men.

Time and again the majority of Congress has lost all track of the interest of the whole community to favor the farm bloc, the Legion, the business bloc, or the labor bloc. Congressmen, pressure-group leaders, Administration men, the "loyal opposition" have repeatedly forsaken the clear path of what is best for the country, to follow the path of what they think is best for themselves.

For a few stirring months after Pearl Harbor we really had national unity. We buried our differences in an almost universal desire to serve the nation. Many were ready to sit up all night spotting planes, to work all day for nothing at menial jobs in hospitals, to give unlimited time as air-raid wardens and shore patrols. We were Americans all, in a dangerous world. But as the shock wore off, the unity wore off.

By the early summer of 1943 there were days when it seemed as if the country were falling apart in a welter of strikes, crack-downs, threats, seizures, black-market operations, name-calling, bad blood, double-crossing. It was perfectly clear that those who were making the most noise were thinking about their hurt feelings, or their itch for power, or their pocket-books, or their "competitive position."

Of course, you say; good old human nature. Then where was our human nature right after Pearl Harbor? Where do the Russians, the British, the Japanese get their devotion? Human nature is not something that goes on and off like a faucet. Again, it may be objected that pressure-group politics is a good old American custom. No one can gainsay it. So was marching off to war with a squirrel rifle an old American custom. Customs change.

The Great Society

The need for developing a sense of the whole community does not arise alone from the war. We cannot operate a high-energy economy without it. As the power age advances, every man jack of us becomes more dependent on the community. Yet the community is so large that we are seldom aware of this dependence. Only when the electric power goes off in a blizzard, or the milk train breaks down, do we realize for a few minutes how the community bears us in its arms. From San Diego to Aroostook County, we are our brothers' keepers. All the Main Streets merge into one great society.

The pressure groups seem to be largely led by men who are ignorant of the fact that we are our brothers' keepers. They think such talk is Sunday School stuff. They are wrong. It is the first law of modern technology.

The self-sufficiency of the individual farmer or the small local group, which was characteristic of the handicraft age, has been sacrificed to the superior output of quantity production. Each worker, manager, establishment, now performs a single small operation in a vast national assembly line. Every citizen is dependent for his food and shelter on millions of other citizens. Nobody can go it alone any more. Your great-grandfather could get three square meals a day from his own farm, if a little salt were thrown in. Can you? Figure out where the items for a simple breakfast come from, and how many people are involved, directly and indirectly, in producing and delivering them.

The men who run pressure groups seem to assume that their crowd can get along. They act largely on the principle of Me First and the public be damned. If their special interest and the public interest happen to coincide, it is probable they did not plan it that way. If the public is at war, why so much the worse for the public. They talk tough and act tough. I am not here arguing about their morals. My point is more serious. I am looking back at France in 1940, and ahead to Demobilization Day in 1946—or whenever it comes. I am arguing that such behavior can tear the whole economy to shreds, engulfing the tough babies with the rest of us.

Dominoes in a Row

The depression should have provided proof enough that Americans are tied together in a single organism. No group was immune as the blight spread. Even the lordly Telephone Company had to draw on its surplus account to pay dividends. Everyone went to hell in a hack—trade-unionists, unorganized workers, bankers, share-croppers, white-collar employees, architects, railroad men, teachers, writers, government employees, "widows and orphans," farmers, brokers, fishermen, artists, miners, engineers—everybody. Do you remember the empty, flyblown store windows along Main Street in 1933?

We went over like dominoes in a row without knowing what had hit us. We ought to know by this time. A high-energy society is not only inordinately productive, as Veblen used to say; it is extremely vulnerable. If the idea is every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost, the devil in no time at all works right up to the front of the line.

The pressure boys, most of them, act as though they had never heard of this state of affairs. They apparently think they can still obtain three squares a day off the old farm. They think they can kick and scratch their way through the delicate veins, nerves, tendons of an interdependent community, and get theirs. Right now they hope, most of them, if they bite hard enough in the clinches and knock over enough Congressmen, that they can claw their way up to a nice little shelf, safe from the ravages of the post-war depression.

If this spirited free-for-all actually persists after Demobilization Day, nobody will get anything, especially the rest of us. There will be no safe little shelf for anybody. With interdependence increased by $20 billion of new mass-production facilities, the dominoes ought to go down even more rapidly. There will be no peace on Main Street.

It looks as if the pressure groups must either face the kind of world they are living in today, made more tenuous by the technical complexities of total war, or keep on cutting the community's life lines until somebody comes riding in on a white horse. At which point Congress becomes a memory, and pressure groups go underground for an indefinite stay. They have been underground for twenty-seven years in Russia and for eleven years in Germany.

I am clinging to the hope that a democracy can discipline itself. Look at Britain. . . . Yes, but look at France in 1940.

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The Price We Pay in Italy

BY ERIC SEVAREID

London, November 7

GENERAL SIR HAROLD L. G. ALEXANDER, Allied commander-in-chief in Italy,* has just had his first press conference in some nine months with the war correspondents there. He defended the Italian campaign as a whole and explained that the Eighth and Fifth armies cannot reasonably be expected to drive the Germans from the Po valley unless the enemy makes some mistake which can be exploited. This most important statement was generally overlooked by the press.

Here in London one senses that the British public has never been much taken with the Italian campaign as a vital contribution to Germany's defeat. Have we, in fact, had a victory in Italy? A clear-cut victory speaks for itself, and the very fact that General Alexander felt compelled to state his claims indicates that public opinion is justified in feeling doubt about the whole thing and wishing to reserve judgment until all the facts are in. I spent five spring and summer months in Italy as war correspondent and while men were dying in their great effort felt constrained from publicly questioning their mission—indeed, the Allied censorship in Italy, actually run by the British, was always quick to blue-pencil even implied criticisms. Members of Alexander's staff even made a habit of telling correspondents not only what they should not write but what they should. Since the Commander-in-chief has now spoken about the past, perhaps a reporter may also take the occasion to look back and issue some reminders.

I for one—and many of my colleagues from that front are of like mind—am impressed by the major miscalculations made in high places. There is not the slightest doubt that the original decision to invade Italy proper was based on a belief that the Germans would not give battle in southern Italy, and that if they did they could not possibly maintain more than three or four divisions there because of their very long supply lines and our own mastery of the sky. The Germans surprised us, and the fight was very hard. It was just the first of many surprises. They held us on the Cassino line, where we lost thousands of men, particularly in the tragic winter attempt by the American Thirty-sixth Division to cross the Rapido River, an attempt which the divisional commander pleaded against with tears. We landed at Anzio in January under the illusion that the Germans, in their alarm, would pull back from the southern front to Rome or beyond. While Churchill was announcing that we would soon have Rome and Alexander was scolding the Anzio reporters for being "alarmists," our cooks and truck drivers were being thrown into the line to stem the German counter-attacks which threatened to drive us into the sea. We recovered our safety, but we lost a strategic, mountainous 10 per cent of the original beachhead and never regained it until the break-out began on May 23. By that date 3,000 Americans lay in the Anzio cemetery; the total of British dead I do not know. We had taken some 4,000 German prisoners, and they had captured "rather more" of our men, as a G-2 colonel put it. After the break-out in May, General Clark's Fifth Army headquarters issued a statement which broadly implied that Anzio was now fully justified—a statement many reporters refused to send to their papers.

We tried to smash the German resistance at Cassino in mid-March with a much-publicized obliteration bombing, followed by an attack by Indians and New Zealanders. It failed completely, and the front went static until the grand offensive opened on May 11 from Cassino to the Tyrrhenian Sea. On that day Alexander issued an order defining his objective as the *destruction of the German armies in Italy*. His troops were told, "You will be supported by overwhelming air forces, and in guns and tanks we are far superior." Nothing was then said about Rome, although of course we expected to take it. Rome was regarded by the generals as purely a political objective, of no military value whatever—actually a liability, since we would have to divert transport and men to feed it. Reporters were told that this offensive was directly connected with the coming invasion of Europe: that we were to oblige the Germans to divert large forces to Italy, that we could accomplish this only by destroying the formations already there, and that if we merely compelled a slow German retreat we would have failed in the primary mission.

Now, in his November 1 statement—I am going by the account in the London *Times*—Alexander says that he aimed to destroy "as much as possible of the enemy forces" and to produce a first-class victory before the second front opened in France, and that "Rome was that victory." He says we inflicted 194,000 casualties on the Germans—though casualty figures for the enemy can never be more than an approximation—at a cost of 116,000 of our own. At the same time he says that only five German divisions were sent into Italy from other fronts after May 11, a reinforcement or replacement of only one-fifth, since twenty-five German divisions were in Italy on that date. Did we, then, give important aid to the second front?

The General, in defending his record, declared further that at no time had he had more than a slight numerical superiority over the Germans. But at various crucial moments of contact we certainly had more than a "slight" superiority. On the southern front, on May 11, we opposed fourteen Allied divisions to the Germans' five. When the battle on the Anzio front opened on May 23, we had seven plus against their five. The Germans, of course, were later reinforced, but it should also be pointed out that the German divisions were nearly always much smaller than ours, running from one-half to two-thirds of our divisional strength. With only a few exceptions, such as the First Parachute and the Hermann Göring divisions, these were hand-me-down enemy divisions, containing troops too old or too young, interspersed with re-

* On November 26 General Alexander was made Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean theater and General Mark Clark became Commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Italy.

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luctant Russians and other undependable odd lots. The Germans had far fewer guns and tanks, almost no planes at all, and only a fraction of the Allied transport. In May it was estimated we had on the beachhead alone as many vehicles as they had in the whole of Italy.

After Rome, the Allied objective was to capture the Po valley, which we have not done yet. Today General Alexander says he was left with too little strength, because the invasion of southern France took a number of his divisions. It did take several excellent divisions, including all the French and some American. But his statement makes strange reading to any correspondent who was in Rome in early August. When high officers then described their plans for getting the valley, and, indeed, for driving on into South Germany, they had full knowledge—as did the correspondents—of the total diversion for southern France.

We have been fighting in Italy now for fourteen months. We have killed and captured many Germans and wrecked a great deal of their equipment. We knocked the remaining Italian Fascists out of the war. We got bases in the south from which to do important strategic bombing of France, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania and from which we sent considerable aid to Marshal Tito. And, if you find satisfaction in it, we helped to lay waste and impoverish for many years the major part of Italy.

It was the kind of warfare in which wide, sweeping movements are impossible, in which troops have no alternative to orthodox, steam-roller advance, crushing towns and villages in their path, laying waste the countryside. As Churchill said, we have drawn a hot rake up the length of Italy. The consequence is that Italy has become such an economic ruin that the Allies must pour in money and materials for years to come, or be prepared to help millions of Italians to emigrate. I am informed that of the total productive capacity of that part of Italy which has been liberated, approximately one-sixth remains. Destruction of industrial power alone between Rome and Naples is so complete that a year will probably be required to bring it back to 15 per cent of its pre-war level. One can hardly begin to speak of the erasure of ancient Roman towns and monuments, which belonged not to the Italians but to all civilized peoples.

The Italian campaign is not all debit, by any means. But some day people will want to know whether the returns balance the enormous investment of Allied lives, ships, transport, and planes. They will ask if we could not have achieved almost as much by stopping in southern Italy at the Volturno line, securing our ports and our bases and using the bulk of our forces in more fruitful encounters elsewhere. They will ask, "Did not the Italian ground fighting really become a war of attrition and nothing more?"

To this observer at least, it seems very late for commanders to continue to place blame for failure on weather and insufficient forces. Why should we not be frank about Italy and admit that Kesselring, on a very small budget, has done a masterful job in making a primary Allied force pay bitterly for every dubious mile of a secondary battlefield; that no matter what heroism our superb fighters showed, the monstrously difficult terrain of the peninsula, with its few roads winding through precipitous mountains, made encirclement and destruction of a retreating enemy impossible at any stage; that the terrain was not an unknown quantity when the original plans were made?

The Allied peoples—and history—may well ask whether the bloody Italian campaign has been a "victory," whether, indeed, it has accomplished anything of a decisive nature.

In the Wind

CIVICS LESSON: The Nebraska Bankers' Association at its annual convention, at Omaha, November 11, voted down a proposal by a small-town banker, E. W. Rossiter of Hartington, that the association's officers be elected by mail. Many country bankers, Rossiter said, find it impossible to attend conventions, and thus the association tends to be dominated by big-town bankers, who are a minority. "Opponents of the vote-by-mail proposal," the Lincoln *State Journal* reports, "said that it was too much like the direct primary."

PATRIOTISM: Private Raymond Matsuda is an American soldier. He is of Japanese descent. He fought overseas for two years with the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, won seven decorations, and on July 22 was shot in the left knee on the Italian front. On November 9, walking with the aid of a crutch, he entered a barber shop in Poston, Arizona, for a haircut. The barber, a Texan named Andrew Hale, threw him out.

HEALTH AND HYGIENE: Dr. Irving S. Cutter's column, How to Keep Well, in the Chicago *Tribune* of November 26, explains the drug habit thus: "Most of these sufferers became opium users because they wanted to escape from the stress and strain of ordinary life; to wander in Elysian Fields where everything is beautiful and serene. They did not choose to make the effort required by a competitive society. If we carry our national social schemes far enough, we will all become dreamers because no one will have the slightest incentive to employ either originality or constructive ingenuity."

CREATIVE WRITING: A soldier writes in the December 8 issue of *Yank*, the army magazine: "It is time that someone told our patriotic writers that some of us G. I.'s don't like the army. The radio serials, the movies, and the newspaper and magazine stories would have the reading public believe that every young man is just crazy about army life. . . . The stories could be a little more realistic. Just once in a while let's have a veteran who is tickled pink when he gets his honorable discharge."

ECONOMICS: An advertisement in the New York *Times* of November 25 offers a gold compact, 2¾ inches in diameter, for $540.

FESTUNG EUROPA: A Nazi newspaper, *Deutsche Stimmen*, published in Bratislava, complains that many people in the Sudetenland are now discovering that they were registered as Germans by mistake in the last census.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind. We will pay $1 for each item accepted.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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Salazar of Portugal: Forgotten Fascist

BY J. R. MIGUEIS

ONLY occasionally does the American press refer to what is going on in Portugal, and then, almost always, it is to praise the "paternal," "benevolent" administration of Premier Oliveira Salazar. The fact of the matter is that Salazar's political structure is fascism, in its purest form.

Salazar is the father of the New State, which was established in 1926 by the suppression of all democratic institutions and guaranties, from free elections to freedom of press and association, and is based on one-party rule. Salazar's political police have indiscriminately arrested, deported, tortured, and assassinated the opposition; the best Portuguese writers and intellectuals have been silenced or live in exile. The corporative monopoly has divided the nation into two groups: a few who become ever richer and the millions who sink into deeper and deeper poverty. Salazar has set up elaborate machinery for propaganda and constructed numerous public buildings to impress the tourist. But work of true importance—education, public health, irrigation, housing—has been utterly neglected. The death rate is increasing at an alarming rate; illiteracy is high.

The British alliance has dictated Portugal's international outlook ever since it was negotiated in the fourteenth century, and friendship for Britain is traditional among the people. Although Salazar has striven to keep the alliance as the main prop of his foreign policy, in order to preserve the Portuguese colonial empire, he has always been frankly sympathetic to the Axis. His relations with the Japanese are still "correct" although they have occupied Portuguese Macao in China and the Portuguese half of Timor. Salazar's protests to them were not nearly so strong as his earlier assault upon the British when, in the spirit of the alliance, they tried to extend their protection to those threatened territories.

During the Spanish war Salazar, with the support of the British appeasers and the Vatican, of which he recently called himself a "vassal," rendered Franco invaluable service by supplying "volunteers," material, and arms. He has entered into a pact with Franco creating a so-called Iberian bloc, and the two *caudillos* have met at frequent intervals to exchange points of view—and political prisoners. Salazar rejoiced over Munich, erected a monument to "peacemaker Chamberlain," and has seldom missed an opportunity to reproach Britain for its subsequent more aggressive policies.

With the outbreak of the World War, Portugal became a nest of Nazi spies and a clearing-house for shady interests. It did business with both belligerent camps. Salazar was adamant in refusing to impose any restrictions on exports to Germany—of tungsten, cork, wines, tinned fish, and so on—even while Great Britain and the United States were purchasing far more Portuguese goods than they needed just to secure the good-will of the dictator.

Salazar's dream was to see a totalitarian world united in a "Christian" anti-Soviet crusade. (Portugal has never recognized the Soviet Union and even objected to its admission to the League of Nations.) The developments of the war, however, changed his dream into a nightmare. The tide turned, and Salazar turned with it. He restrained his anti-British outbursts and open manifestations of sympathy for the Axis. He abolished the fascist salute and the parades of the semi-military Portuguese Legion and Portuguese Youth. He applauded the entrance into the war of Brazil, which had fashioned its *Estado Novo* after his own, and intensified the lucrative commercial dealings between Portugal and the great democracies. But he did all this without in any way altering his domestic policy of totalitarian repression. And Portugal continued to offer opportunities for pro-fascist peace feelers, Nazi spies, and German business. It was only after considerable Allied pressure that Salazar promised a few weeks ago not to harbor war criminals.

After six months of "laborious negotiations" the new orientation of the Portuguese government culminated in the ceding of the Azores bases to the Allies in October, 1943. Britain paid royally for the concession. Very soon numerous shiploads of war material arrived in Lisbon. The people, who whole-heartedly indorse the Allied cause, thought that at last they were going to enter the war. But Salazar hastened to announce that the armaments would "also" be used "to fight the enemies within the country." At about the same time he suddenly recalled his ambassador in London, Professor Armindo Monteiro, who, Salazar was informed, was "conspiring" to assume power on the basis of closer relations with Great Britain and recognition of the Soviet Union.

Conditions within Portugal are desperate. Strikes are multiplying; the people go hungry. Speculation is unbridled, as the Under Secretary of War recently admitted, but only the small merchants are prosecuted. There is a scarcity of essential foodstuffs. Salaries are kept at pre-war subsistence levels, while the cost of living has more than trebled. Last year more than 50,000 workmen of the industrial section of Lisbon went on strike, out of hunger. The government took steps to deport 10,000 of the strikers to Africa in labor battalions, but the shortage of skilled workmen, in conjunction with strong popular protest and the hue and cry raised by British liberals, prevented the plan from being carried out.

Most of the decorative figures of the *Estado Novo* have disappeared from the scene. The Cabinet crisis of some weeks ago has resulted in the formation of a government composed of leaders of the fascist Legion and headed by Gestapo-trained Major Botelho Moniz. Salazar retains the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The reorganization was obviously effected as an emergency measure, to aid in suppressing the approaching democratic upsurge.

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Recently the formation of a National Council for Anti-Fascist Unity was announced, and it apparently comprises all elements opposed to Salazar. The council's program for the future "provisional government" declares that this government will, among other things, destroy the fascist order and reestablish democracy, better the living conditions of the Portuguese people, restore freedom of religion, protect and develop education and culture, and, finally, place Portugal on the side of the United Nations. The council wants the Portuguese people to be united when the hour of victory arrives and accounts are finally settled. It feels that while even one focus of fascism remains in the world, the threat endures of a recurrence of the evil; and that this war will not have been won until democracy prevails everywhere.

Developments in France and Spain are eagerly followed in Portugal. France has always been a great spiritual influence. On the other hand, Spain and Portugal have always pursued a parallel course. United now under the yoke of fascism, they will undoubtedly meet liberation together. Franco's fall will mark the doom of Salazar.

Japan's Underground

BY PACIFICUS

AN IMPORTANT by-product of the recent trek to Yenan of American army officers, State Department and OWI officials, and representatives of the press has been the information obtained about the program and prospects of the anti-fascist movement in Japan. The Eighth Route Army controls territory within twelve miles of Peking, where tens of thousands of Japanese are living, and it has been possible to send couriers back and forth. Moreover, the Communist-controlled Emancipation League has a base in Yenan, and the Americans met its English-speaking leader, Susumu Okano.

Of course no intelligent peace terms for Japan can be written unless we know how great are the possibilities for the emergence of a democratic Japan. Most State Department thinking on post-war Japan assumes that the only alternative to the present military-fascist dictatorship is a "liberal" Japan controlled by the *Zaibatsu* (giant combines) and court circles. It is difficult, however, to criticize the State Department poobahs for ignoring the existence of anti-fascists when such a well-informed liberal as Max Lerner could state flatly in *PM* (February 1, 1944), "There are no groups in Japan, as there are still in Germany, on whose potential democratic strength we can build. . . . Even the doughtiest partisan of the Vansittart thesis agrees that a generation of occupation and reeducation may bring the German people back into the full stream of Western thought and feeling. I have not heard of anyone who would go even that far on Japan."

Mr. Lerner to the contrary, many competent Far Eastern observers in Washington now lean to the belief that there is more hope for democracy in Japan than in Germany. This belief is based on new evidence about the strength of the opposition to the present regime. Broadly speaking, this opposition has three sources, two of which offer authentic resistance.

THE ZAIBATSU

There is, first, the opposition approved by the State Department—that of the giant combines, with which the court is closely connected, the Imperial family itself being one of the largest holders of banking and industrial shares in the country. This "liberal" faction has frequently disagreed with the militarists on strategy but never on the major objective—Japanese domination of East Asia. It has disputed the division of the spoils of war and the control of the government; when General Tojo was unseated last June, he was replaced as head of the Munitions Ministry, which he had devised as an instrument to control the Japanese economy, by Ginjiro Fujiwara, a Mitsui man.

Although the *Zaibatsu,* and more particularly the Mitsuis, who have long enjoyed close relations with the army, has increased its representation in the Koiso Cabinet and is accelerating its war production, important elements in it are also making plans for the eventuality of a Japanese defeat. They hope to obtain a negotiated peace and thus to avoid the destruction of their factories, the participation of Russia in the Pacific war, and the social disorganization that would attend a last-ditch struggle. To this end they plan to establish a constitutional monarchy as a façade behind which they will retain control by manipulating the Emperor, buying out the political parties, and ruthlessly suppressing democratic and left-wing movements.

This group maintains an extensive intelligence and propaganda service. They are able to monitor foreign broadcasts with the radio sets which they use for communication with the ships they operate. They also keep in contact with the world through persons in the diplomatic corps who are sympathetic with their outlook. One of the most important of their connections has been the Japanese diplomatic mission to the Vatican, established in 1942. Vatican officials are reliably reported to have discussed with these Japanese officials the possibilities of a negotiated peace as a means of preventing Soviet participation in the Pacific war and consequent Soviet influence on the peace.

THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION

A second opposition group consists largely of middle-class democrats who believe in Western parliamentary government on the American or British pattern. Thousands of such democrats are still to be found among the professional men, the educated technicians, and the owners of small or medium businesses in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka. These people are unorganized and primarily concerned with keeping themselves out of the hands of the police. But we have had two significant indications that they are still faithful to their opinions.

At the beginning of last summer the Japanese announced the suspension of the magazines *Kaizo* and *Chuo Koron,* intellectual publications analogous to *Harper's* and the *Atlantic Monthly* in this country. The decision to suspend them, according to the news agency Domei, followed an investigation which disclosed that they had "editorial policies which, from the standpoint of leading public thinking in war time, were difficult to tolerate." There must have been a fairly deep-rooted resistance to militarism in these intellectual circles if the government could not clear up the situation by jailing a few men but had to make public admission that

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the staffs of two leading magazines were lukewarm in their support of the war.

Even more significant, however, was the almost simultaneous announcement that Yukio Ozaki, Japan's greatest liberal statesman, had been acquitted by the army-dominated Supreme Court of a charge of lèse majesté. Ozaki is not only an outstanding anti-militarist but the most important living link with the liberal movement of the Meiji period. Active in Japanese politics for over sixty years, he has been the most popular, courageous, and skilful of the small handful of democratic leaders that Japan has produced.

The Japanese Supreme Court reversed a decision by a lower court under which Ozaki was convicted and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment for "a statement made during the course of a political campaign speech in April, 1942," just after the fall of Singapore. The *Zaibatsu* "moderates," who had been hesitant about the tactics of the militarists, were deeply impressed by the amazing successes of the Japanese forces and were hastily climbing on the bandwagon. Ozaki was running for reelection to his seat in the Diet, to which he had been reelected at every election since the Diet was first formed in 1890, a record unparalleled in Japan. The newly formed Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, whose chief function was to defeat such "anti-national" candidates, concentrated its heaviest fire upon him, but despite this official intimidation and the fact that he faced a charge of lèse majesté, he was reelected. In view of Ozaki's past record as a fearless critic of militarism and dictatorship, it is not surprising that the Tojo government attempted to silence him with a jail sentence. What *is* remarkable is the fact that his great popularity among the people made it advisable for the government to free him.

The existence of a group of unorganized democrats is important not so much for the present as for the post-war period, when they can provide much of the political leadership for the new forces which will be released by Japan's military defeat. It is among these democrats rather than among the phony *Zaibatsu* "moderates" or "liberals" that we should look for administrators during the military occupation of Japan.

THE PEOPLE'S EMANCIPATION LEAGUE

The best-organized and most effective of the resistance movements is the Communist-led Japanese People's Emancipation League. Having been forced underground in 1928, the Communists have had long experience in illegal activity. The extensive industrialization of Japan during the past decade has enlarged their opportunities, particularly since, owing to Japan's critical shipping shortage, Japanese conquests, unlike Nazi conquests, have not raised the people's living standards.

The effectiveness of the Emancipation League is attested to by the stringency of Japanese police regulations. Captured Germans who have recently returned from Japan report that they could travel in Japan with more freedom than Japanese industrial workers. During the Diet session in the spring of 1943 government officials warned that the Communists were making headway among the workers. Later General Onishi said in a speech, "We know there are workers in our country who think only of their own interests and seek a return to conditions of free labor. Such people deserve death." It is estimated that there are from eight to ten thousand Communists in Japan.

The head of the Emancipation League, Susumu Okano, a former Comintern leader, arrived at Yenan from Moscow in the spring of 1943. He has some 400 Japanese working with him in the border region; most of them are doing front-line propaganda work, but about a hundred are teaching in Yenan or studying at the Workers' and Peasants' School. Of Okano's forces a minority are old-line Communists who made their way to Yenan; the majority are converted prisoners, or soldiers whom the league's propaganda induced to come over.

The fundamental post-war objective of the league is the completion of what Okano describes as the "bourgeois democratic revolution" in Japan. This includes the elimination of feudal conditions on the land and of the oligarchical control of the government and the establishment of government control over the *Zaibatsu*. The Emperor is not attacked in the league's propaganda, since it is believed that the people of Japan are not prepared to discard him as an institution. Okano hopes to obtain the retirement of the present emperor and the scrapping of the institution as soon as raising the issue will not play into the hands of the military fascists.

The propaganda of the league is effective because it emphasizes the economic problems of the common Japanese soldier. OWI officials have been so impressed with its force and with the moderation of the league's program that they have suggested coordinating our own psychological warfare with the league's. State Department officials have turned thumbs down on this proposal, explaining that we might antagonize the Japanese "liberals" if we worked with the Communists. Perhaps we had better call off the B-29 raids as well, since the bombs are destroying the aircraft factories and naval shipyards of the "liberal" Mitsubishis!

NOT HERE—THERE'S THE SPOT FOR THE PICNIC

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

NOTES BY THE WAY

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

I WENT TO THE COUNTRY for the first time in many weeks and as usual wondered why I had stayed away so long. I think it is partly because, aside from objective reasons, "going to the country" can be so much of a social issue among city dwellers that one can easily come to regard it as just another form of compulsion, not to say snobbery. The reality of nature fades out, and the idea of it becomes a counter in a tense competitive game. For instance, I shall probably boast, am already boasting, about the two four-mile walks I took and exclaim possessively over the heat of the sun in late November, as if they were feathers in my cap.

I happened to have a happy week-end. Everything, particularly my own mood, conspired to make it so. I "connected" with nature and experienced the actual rather than the theoretical pleasure of putting one foot before the other for miles, tracing the fine rising lines of elm trees uncluttered by leaves, noting the unlikely "impressionistic" facts of green grass and purple air, getting tired, sitting on a stone and watching squirrels and chipmunks whisking about with the sun in their tails.

But it is not always so. To go to the country it is not enough simply to go to the country. Sometimes the transition from the pace and preoccupations of a huge city to those of the country—and back again—is in itself so wearing that a week-end, brief as it must be, can seem just another routine of chores, of which taking a walk is quite as unrewarding as catching trains. And I have known professional country goers who seemed to me to be caught in a kind of slavery of rushing back and forth which had nothing to do with nature as reality but only with "the country" as a convention, fashionable or other, or as a duty to one's health.

On this particular Monday, however, I can say that I have really been to the country and that nature, when you do get to it, is wonderful.

A FRIEND HAS PASSED ON a letter from an army photographer who got to Paris while the street fighting was still going on.

> I drove in through the Porte d'Orléans. The people were so thick in the streets it was dangerous for them. There was a temporary tie-up in the traffic, and instantly there were 300 people around our vehicle. *"Nous sommes très contents," "Nous sommes très heureux."* In the background were wrecked German artillery pieces and tanks. Near the Café de la Paix I stopped and checked in at the Hotel ——. Then I filmed the Café de la Paix with Yanks and French girls drinking. Above all the commotion one could hear shots not far away. The fighting was still going on. As the procession was going through the Place de la Concorde, some Germans and militia (*Milice*) men opened up from the surrounding roof tops. Then a battle royal started. We got there while it was still going on. An angry bunch of F. F. I. surged up to the top of a building and captured several militia men and a German. They let them loose in the crowd, which engulfed them and *literally* tore them to pieces. This happened I don't know how many times. . . .
>
> I saw Picasso. I was the first American press person, or for that matter any American, he'd seen in four years. He's quite well off and wasn't starving. . . . He has a young daughter with whom he's very much enraptured. Also a son, but I didn't see him. . . . During the fighting, so he told me, he just went on sketching portraits of his daughter. He was in a state of great jubilation, as was the rest of Paris. When I asked him about the Germans bothering him, he replied that the Gestapo had visited him four or five times and searched his house but hadn't taken anything. Whenever the Gestapo raided anybody else who was wealthy and less well known, they'd walk out with all the valuables. . . .
>
> He has painted quite a lot during the past four and a half years. At the time he was working on a small water color based on a painting by Poussin but of course changed all around. It was a mélange of arms and legs and teeth and horns. Reminded me of a battlefield I'd left only a few days previous.
>
> Picasso asked about DuChamp, Breton, Tanguy, Dali ("le clune," he said), Léger, Matta, Mesens, and others. He also said that Bracque was quite fine, as were most of the others.

I THUMBED THROUGH a dissertation on "Criticism in American Periodicals of the Works of Henry James from 1866 to 1916" by Richard Nicholas Foley (Catholic University of America Press). It is not a "reading book," as a child once remarked of something quite different, but it contains very interesting material.

The *Independent* said that there was no heart in "The Portrait of a Lady." Such a statement seems almost ludicrous, for if ever a character was drawn with love that character is Isabel Archer. It was James's "impartial" and inexorable unfolding of her fate, I suppose, which in the age of Dickens made him appear heartless. As *The Nation* said at that time:

> Robust people, doubtful of the depth of an emotion that does not shriek, incredulous of intellectual tragedy, unsusceptible to comedy not grinning or roaring, can hardly find [Mr. James's stories] worthy even of august disapproval . . . the facts of incident or event are really of the slightest importance in passing judgment on Mr. James's work. He stands or falls by the truth . . . of his interpretation of the thought, motive, caprice of the people whom he confronts with any problem of existence . . . making no concessions to popular conceptions of what is nice and proper, or even probable, according to sentimental or provincial notions.

In general James's new-fangled psychological analysis of his characters and his objective treatment of them—both a part of today's convention—puzzled the critics. Mr. Foley's dissertation also records fully the annoyance at James's handling of the American character. And here again the judgment of yesterday seems strange, considering the purity

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and strength, in the moral sense, with which he endows the Isabel Archers, the Milly Theales, the Madame de Mauves. What rankled, among other things, no doubt was that James's Americans, especially his American heroines, while they might win the moral war, lost the social battles with Europe—the circumstance which gave such ironic edge to his conception of "the heiress of all the ages."

Good and Evil, Here and Now

THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENCE. By Reinhold Niebuhr. Charles Scribner's Sons. $2.

THOSE who believe that self-interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law are the children of light. The cynics who know no law beyond their will and interest are the children of this world or children of darkness." As a Christian, as a philosopher, as a citizen, Niebuhr takes his stand with the children of light. But he wishes that his fellow-angels were not so deplorably naive. His tone is that of Clemenceau ironically admiring the "holy simplicity" of President Wilson; it is almost that of the "realists" who sneered at Henry Wallace as a "do-gooder."

The weakness of the democratic position, according to Niebuhr, is that it assumes the essential goodness of human nature. Remove unnatural obstacles—this or that institution, monarchy, nationalism, armaments, property, drinks—and the words of the Prophet will come true:

> The loathsome mask has fallen, the man remains
> Scepterless, free, uncircumscribed, but man
> Equal, unclassed, tribeless and nationless,
> Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the King
> Over himself. . . .

Now Niebuhr was, I surmise, properly "brought up on total depravity." He believes that there is evil in man's heart and that there is evil in nature; he should believe that there *is evil in the Ruler of the Universe*, or that there are two rulers, eternally at war.

Niebuhr easily raises the problem to ethical heights. But he does not lose sight of its immediate, down-to-earth implications. Pacifism—the moral backbone of isolationism—the Kellogg Pact, the agitation for disarmament without commitments were manifestations of naive "naturism." Man is good as he comes out of his Creator's hands; it is those horrid guns that make him wicked.

Unthinking optimism will be shattered against hard facts and leave a free field for cynicism. The light is true, and we must follow the light. But it does not fully reveal the Holy City in a sudden flash. It leads us through crags, pitfalls, and quagmires. The children of light must be wise in their generation. They must fight, and not simply deny, the forces of evil. They need *humility:* they must keep in mind that although their faith is eternal truth, their preconceptions, their interests, their methods, and even their beliefs alter with the constant and complex growth of history. It is not enough to outlaw sin; we have to plot our cautious way through inevitable confusions and contradic-

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tions. Will and good-will, yes, but also a critical spirit, tolerance, pluralism, the sense that "democracy" is no abracadabra but "a method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems."

Niebuhr's main thesis I indorse with enthusiasm. I differ only about some of the illustrations. His cautious method would lead us to realize that there may be "children of light" among the Nazis, if they sacrifice their personal interests for what they deem to be a higher good: "children of light" may be led astray. There may be "children of darkness" among the defenders of liberty, if by liberty they mean unlimited license to grab. Niebuhr's children of light form a strange array. They comprise Rousseauistic democrats, romanticists, bourgeois liberals, utopian socialists, and Marxists—for Marx brings us back to Shelley. The difference evidently is not one of doctrine but of temperament. On every side there are men who uphold a cause for its remote ideal and others who "are in it for what they can get right now." On every side there are crude dogmatists and critical thinkers, optimists and pessimists. Among orthodox Christians some are quietists and trust unduly in the infinite goodness and power of God—Fénelon was the forerunner of Rousseau; others think in terms of a fight with the devil, Prince of this World. Reaction is not invariably based on pessimism. Pétain's ideology was an idyllic retrospective Utopia: destroy that thing of evil, the democratic republic, and France will *naturally* return to innocence and happiness: sturdy frugal peasants under their squire and their parish priest, with the National Grandfather smiling benignly upon them all. The liberal bourgeois tradition has a Voltairean tinge: a realistic fight against definite abuses, privileges, and superstitions. The Voltairean bourgeois is no Pangloss. American democracy is thoroughly pessimistic: no man is good enough to rule others, every man in authority must be watched and checked, for he is presumed to be a radical. Laissez faire has its optimistic face—Adam Smith and the guiding hand—and its pessimistic aspect: Malthusian and Darwinian, the scramble for life, and devil-take-the-hindmost. Marxism is light and darkness.

The extreme difficulty of honest thinking is well illustrated in the last chapter—The World Community. Niebuhr is right in maintaining that it would not suffice to proclaim the world state, with a perfect constitution and a Bill of Rights. There must be a slow, confused, historical growth before the United States, for instance, will be ready to accept democratic world law and bow before the decision of an alien majority. But he is of two minds about our present method of ap-

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

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

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proach. He knows that the big-power idea is power politics pure and simple, and leads to war. Yet he feels that he has to be "realistic"—that is, cynical—and accept evil provisionally. Realism consists in recognizing evil *in order to fight it*. Light does not ignore darkness, but does not capitulate to darkness. As a student of history I can safely prophesy that the Big Three fallacy will not work. It represents a moment in the development of mankind, not a permanent condition; defeated powers will come back, and others will grow. United on the basis of force, the Big Three will soon jockey for position—as Marshal Smuts already advises—and ultimately they will fight. The unity of the Big Three, if it is not based on something deeper than their bigness, can be preserved only through an alliance; an alliance means, "My ally, right or wrong!" and you will never get the American people to accept such a commitment. A "proximate solution for the insoluble problem" must be found. But the proximate solution must be pointing the right way: toward justice, not selfish power; toward the light, not toward darkness.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

BRIEFER COMMENT

Señor Aguirre Tells His Story

THE STUDENT of the Spanish civil war will find his principal interest in the first part of "Escape Via Berlin," a dignified and uncommonly well-written book by José Antonio de Aguirre, the president of the Basque Republic (Macmillan, $3). The matters of greatest importance, perhaps, are the proposal of patronage and separate peace with the Basques put forward by Mussolini in 1937 and the offer of mediation with Franco made by the Papacy in May of that year. The first attempt at corruption was rebuffed by the Basque leader and the second, one believes, would have been, though the Basque Cabinet was given no opportunity of falling for the Vatican's pro-fascist maneuver. Cardinal Pacelli's cable was addressed to Valencia, where the Republican government prevented its transmission to Bilbao. Not without justification, the author considers this suppression reprehensible, though Valencia's point of view is understandable. There are many other matters of interest in this first part, including the best account yet given of the Basque surrender, which was made to the Italian conquerors of Euzkadi, not to Franco. The war as a whole is not subjected to sustained or penetrating analysis on any level. The spirit of the book is one of human decency approaching nobility, religious devotion, and fervent love for the *patria chica*. The political doctrine is a sincerely believed conservative democracy. Part II is of equal interest and is even exciting. It recounts Señor Aguirre's extraordinary escape from Dunkirk, not to London, but to Berlin, and thence at last to Sweden, Brazil, and the United States. The remainder of the book is chiefly taken up with somewhat trite political disquisitions on the war which the present writer has too often read elsewhere. They add nothing to one's understanding, though from the standpoint of orthodox democracy they are sound and ably made. This is not an important book, but it is a good and valuable one.

RALPH BATES

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Two Commanders

THE MILITARY HISTORY of the Civil War period has been augmented by the recently published biographies of two of the more colorful but less important leaders. Walter H. Hebert has analyzed the military career of General Hooker ("Fighting Joe Hooker," Bobbs-Merrill, $3.50), the West Point graduate who was a vigorous division leader and a fairly successful corps commander, but who failed miserably and needlessly in his only battle at the head of an entire army—at Chancellorsville—and having aroused the strong animosity of Grant and Sherman, was eventually relieved from all active command. Virgil Carrington Jones has described the career of John Singleton Mosby ("Ranger Mosby," The University of North Carolina Press, $3.50), the colorful colonel of partisan Rangers who for more than two years operated in the rear of the federal lines in that area of Virginia which lies east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Mr. Hebert's book is scholarly, competently written, supplied with excellent maps. It suffers only from its subject's lack of stature. Mr. Jones, a newspaperman, has written brilliantly of one of the most picturesque of cavalry leaders. His book lacks the scholarship and critical analysis of the other, but it is a fascinating book to read. RALPH ADAMS BROWN

Exit Franz Werfel

FRANZ WERFEL HAS FORESTALLED my review of his "Between Heaven and Earth" (Philosophical Library, $3) by writing, "There is no more consuming, more insolent, more sneering, more diabolical arrogance than that of the artistic advance guard and radical intellectuals," to whom Mr. Werfel declares he once belonged. "We were the insignificant stokers who preheated the hell in which mankind is now roasting." Proust—and Mr. Werfel—caused the fall of France. "Between Heaven and Hell" is a confessional account of the neo-Catholicism which underlies "Embezzled Heaven," "Song of Bernadette" ("the highest possible form of modern narrative writing consists of the mystic basic facts of the spiritual realm . . . depicted by the most artful and economical means of realism"), and other writings by which Mr. Werfel has presumably amassed a fortune in preaching the religion of poverty. "The real crux," we learn, is "not between right and left but between above and below." With the other angry anti-positivists of current fashion he hates secular liberalism above all things: "The liberal era has confused equality before putrefaction with equality before God." Pitifully ignorant of all non-religious philosophies except mid-nineteenth-century positivism, which he calls "naturalistic nihilism," Werfel develops his pious and petulant polemic through three lectures and 130 apothegms. Striking 133 noble attitudes in one book, Mr. Werfel shows himself a prince among uplifters.

Whatever one thinks of all the others who wish to repudiate secular liberalism and return to some earlier and "deeper" credo, one must grant that Franz Werfel deserves all Nietzsche's denunciations of the neo-religious intellectuals. "They are not even old," said Nietzsche, "only tired, mean, comfortable. Once they fluttered around light and freedom . . . a little older, a little colder, and already they are mysti-



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fiers and mumblers and stay-at-homes." Or, as Mr. Werfel himself writes of the new return to religion, "A snob can stand anything except being out of date. I foresee a panic, a mass rout through all the emergency exits into a new mysticism."

ERIC RUSSELL BENTLEY

Some Excellent Reproductions

THE STANDARD OF COLOR REPRODUCTION at popular prices set for this country by several of the plates in Hyperion's recent "French Impressionists" is surpassed in "*Masterpieces of Painting from the National Gallery of Art*" (distributed by Random House, $6.50). The quality of the eighty-five color plates in this book—all of works in the National Gallery at Washington—is much more constant. Each reproduction is accompanied by a quotation from a famous writer—Ovid, Dante, Hegel, Henry James, Berenson, T. S. Eliot, and many others. The excerpts could not have been better chosen.

And there has just been republished in portfolio form a book of excellent reproductions of Paul Klee's line drawings, edited by Will Grohmann, which first appeared in 1934 in Germany, only to be confiscated as "degenerate art" (Curt Valentin, 32 East Fifty-seventh Street, $15). Grohmann's original and valuable introduction is given in English. These drawings exhibit the essence, the very nerve fibers, of Klee's art.

But perhaps it is necessary to remind the reader that reproductions are never completely satisfactory and that there is no substitute for a visit to the originals.

CLEMENT GREENBERG

For the Defense

IN "China Takes Her Place" (Harper, $2.75), a description of China's development under the republic, Carl Crow puts up the best defense possible of the Kuomintang, skilfully making all the necessary qualifications. The introductory chapters, covering the early post-revolutionary years, are a good reportorial job done in a lively and entertaining vein. Most of the later chapters, and the better part of the book, are devoted to an account of the progress China has been fortunate enough to achieve under the Kuomintang since 1927. Even the tax system, it would seem, has been handled in such ingenious fashion that the authorities have deprived the landlords of the profits accruing from increased land values. The generalization is conveyed rather than stated outright, but it still might leave an unwary reader feeling sorry for the landlords under this efficient and determined administration. Mr. Crow pays full tribute to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, noting that "a century from now they will be enshrined as gods, and millions as yet unborn will burn incense to the memories of the most famous married couple in the long and romantic history of China." His special enthusiasm, however, is left for the New Life movement, of which he observes, "No more ambitious social program was ever launched in any country, and none has ever been more successful." Carl Crow should have an interview with Brooks Atkinson, who brings back even later information from China.

T. A. B.

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Drama

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

THE LATE GEORGE APLEY" (Lyceum Theater) makes a very pleasant evening indeed. According to the accurate description of the program, it is "based on" the novel by John P. Marquand, and if all our plays must be derived from novels or short stories, then I only hope that most of the people who make them will know their business as well as Mr. Marquand and George Kaufman—jointly credited with this dramatization—show that they know theirs.

I still think that the present vogue of adaptations from this and that is deplorable and that things have come to a pretty pass when the theater cannot find anyone to write original plays or when—if this is the case—theatrical producers are afraid to trust their judgment of any work which has not already proved its ability to attract an audience in some other form. But Mr. Marquand and Mr. Kaufman have at least not rested content with the mere presentation of certain scenes from a novel. They evidently began by dissolving the original work into its component elements, and they have constructed a play, with a play's shape and a play's movement, out of these same elements. Happily the result is something a good deal nearer to a dramatic equivalent of the novel than dramatizations usually are. If I were a member of the paying public I would, it seems to me, prefer something new to something which I had previously enjoyed in a different guise five or six years before—unless, of course, that paying public has by now completely adopted the shopgirl's attitude which someone (possibly Mr. Kaufman himself) ridiculed some years ago in a scene in which the young lady applicant at a lending library who found herself sixteenth on the waiting list for "Gone with the Wind" concluded philosophically that she would rather wait for the movie anyway. But, as I said above, if we must have adaptations, then we may at least be permitted to hope that they will be as good as this one.

Perhaps the very fact that the form of the original novel presented obvious difficulties is in part responsible for the happy result. It was told in the first person as the supposed autobiography of a man convinced that he was producing an impression very different from that which the reader was receiving or the actual author intending. By no expedient less desperate than some "expressionistic" technique can you present on the stage a man as he seems to himself rather than as he seems to the spectator, and so the whole ironic device on which the novel was based had to be scrapped and a play had to be written which would present in some different way the paradox of George Apley, that good Bostonian who went to the Monday Club on Mondays and the Tuesday Club on Tuesdays, not because so doing made him happy, but because he owed a duty to his forefathers who had sacrificed themselves on the same altar which someone had erected to the Expected Thing. Possibly the play is broadened a little. I do not, for example, remember in the novel any passage intended to produce quite the sort of laughter evoked when Mrs. Apley, hearing for the first time about Freud, wonders that he could find enough to say about sex to fill a whole volume. But for the most part the play, like the novel, is effectively subdued, the ironic conclusion is kept; and I am not sure but that anything lost in abandoning the indirect method of the original narrative is not more than compensated for by the increased force of direct presentation.

Neither the novel nor the play could, I suppose, be credited with any great originality so far as its satiric point is concerned. Mr. Marquand did not add much to the comic legend of Boston. When one comes right down to it, little is said that is not implied in such jokes as the one about the man who described the route taken in a drive to California by revealing that they "went through Dedham" or in that about the lady who begged pardon of the visitor from Iowa for warning her that in Boston the accepted pronunciation was "Ohio." But an infinite number of variations are played upon the theme and played subtly enough to make what I suppose is really a burlesque produce the effect of comedy. Moreover, the play manages also to recapture what was, after all, the best and most difficult effect of the novel by making George Apley more than merely a figure of fun. He is also, of course, pathetic. More than that, he has moments when he is almost noble in his slow-witted, Colonel Newcomish, way. Leo J. Carroll, as the hero, is quite perfect. For that matter the entire cast is excellent, and so is Sheldon Cheyney's stately drawing-room in which generations of Apleys have suffered their dignified and expensive boredom. I must say, however, that I was a bit distressed by the imposing growth of indoor ivy. An official nature lover like George Apley would have known that it needed a better lighted position.

Lawrence Stallings's new play, "The Streets Are Guarded" (Henry Miller's Theater), arrives almost precisely twenty years after his "What Price Glory?" and it is very different indeed, with its grave instead of ribald consideration of that phenomenon which is known as a soldier's courage. As a whole the play certainly cannot be called successful. In fact, I am forced to confess that often I did not know either what the author was driving at or even just what was going on down there in the Pacific, where the remnants of several dispersed groups of marines, sailors, and air-force men were still trying to do their duty on a tiny island. But there are moments of sincere eloquence, and though I do not usually have much patience with plays which fail to come off, I must add that I found this one frequently interesting and sometimes moving.

Films

JAMES AGEE

THE Very Thought of You," a story about the wives of absent soldiers, entangles some sincerity and even insight, and some pretty good family quarrels, and some straight acting in so much wincing embarrassment of overstylized talk and of rubbing the audience's nose in emotions that it is hardly if at all worth seeing. "Dark Waters" is a thriller about a young woman, convalescent from shock, who suffers among cryptic surroundings and ambiguous people on a swampy Louisiana sugar plantation. It has many—perhaps too many is one trouble—of the elements of a good fright-picture, but most of the time they either get in each other's way or suggest their possibilities without achieving them. "Together Again" is a comedy about a small-town female mayor, too much on her dignity to be interested in love, and a big-town sculptor who changes her mind. There are flashes of wit in it, verbal, even psychological, and even visual, but nearly all of them, like the story itself, are suicidally professional and forced. "And Now Tomorrow" is about a deaf upper-class girl and an ex-proletarian doctor who, after some machine-turned comedy of sex antagonism, restores her hearing and, presumably, dissolves her

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snobbery. As John McManus of *PM* points out, it is rather cruel to quite a number of people in the audience to show a cure for the kind of deafness that results from meningitis without letting you know whether there is in fact any such cure.

"Lost in a Harem" is a flat Abbott and Costello comedy with a rather amusing use of a ham actor, his hallucinations, which remain invisible to the audience, the sound track which records them, and some pantomime which, scarcely developed as it is, is still as tantalizing and refreshing, against all the screen-paralyzing contemporary blabber, as a teaspoonful of water in the middle of a desert. Two current cartoon shorts, whose titles and author for some reason slip my mind, alternate heavy but sometimes funny facetiousness with bits of active imagination. Both star Warner Brothers' anarchic rabbit; one burlesques a South Sea travelogue, the other a Western. "V-1," an English short about robot bombs, is well edited, better written than average—it is wordy but at least some of the words count for something—and honestly narrated in an unaffected voice. It contains one Miltonic shot, made from a plane, in which a struck bomb, detonated in flight, reaches out an arm of explosion from perhaps a mile away, and as broad as a boulevard, which with a speed that pulls you out of your chair approaches and fills the screen.

JAMES AGEE

Music

B. H. HAGGIN

A CONDUCTOR, as I have observed before, usually does not put a concerto on a program as a piece of music worth doing for itself. It is, instead, something he has to do for a soloist engaged for his box-office drawing-power, and something the conductor has little interest in since its purpose is to show off the soloist, not himself. The concertos we hear are, therefore, the comparatively small group of works that pianists and violinists use contantly for the display of their technical and musical powers; and most of the performances we hear are the product of a single run-through rehearsal which barely suffices to gear the soloist's performance with the perfunctorily conducted orchestral performance in time. Under those conditions the orchestral part is reduced in significance to a mere accompaniment; and it is contended that whatever Barbirolli's other inadequacies he is an excellent accompanist—merely because he can manage to arrive at the same point as the soloist at the same time. A concerto performance in which the orchestral part has been carefully worked out is, then, rare; but even rarer is the kind of performance that we got from Schnabel and the New Friends of Music Orchestra under Stiedry and the National Orchestral Association under Barzin a few years ago—in which the solo and orchestral parts are beautifully integrated in every detail of style and phrasing.

Listening to a Beethoven or Mozart concerto conducted by Toscanini one hears not merely a carefully rehearsed orchestral part, but one in which familiar phrases acquire amazingly new contours and inflections and significance, and counterpoints and figurations previously unheard in the mass of sound emerge with startling clarity and impact from the newly transparent textures; and one hears all these things related in a continuous, rhythmically elastic progression which is built up into a coherent and powerful structure. It is an exciting experience; and it remains that even when the structure is built up around nothing—around, that is, the characterless flow of sounds produced by Ania Dorfman in Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 1. Or around something as alien in style as Artur Rubinstein's playing in the Concerto No. 3.

In the present Beethoven series only Serkin's playing in the Concerto No. 4 has fitted well into the Toscanini framework. It was often unimpressive in its mere fluency if one recalled Schnabel's sharply contoured or subtly inflected phrasing at the same point (the first-movement cadenza was one such point), but taken by itself it had the right overall character and sufficient vitality, and also sufficient tranquillity where this was called for—the nature of the work producing fewer than the usual number of occasions where one hears the shrilly percussive sound as one sees the tossed head and upflung arm that endear Serkin to the great musical public.

Someone—it must have been a second violinist—once remarked wryly that quartets had been formed around first violinists, around violists, and around cellists, but never around second violinists. Nevertheless the second violinist is not without his importance, as one can hear these days in the performances of the Budapest Quartet, in which Edgar Ortenberg has replaced Alexander Schneider. This has produced a change in the sound of the group: Ortenberg's tone and style are not robust like Schneider's but delicate like the first violinist Roisman's; so that whereas formerly the first and second violins were like soprano and mezzo-soprano now they are like two sopranos. And the process of absorbing Ortenberg is not yet completed: some performances—presumably of works that have been rehearsed and played more—have the unapproached Budapest Quartet perfection of blended sound and ensemble execution; others haven't it yet; and one may even hear things as unbelievable as momentary confusions and lapses from pitch.

Victor's set (973; $3.50) of Howard Hanson's Symphony No. 1 in E minor ("Nordic") straggled in late; and I am late in reporting that this early work of Hanson seems to be the original model of what Hollywood composers have been writing for the sound-tracks of films. The performance by the Eastman-Rochester Symphony under the direction of the composer is excellently recorded. Victor must have its reasons for this set; but for you and me it is sheer waste of precious materials and labor that might have made available to us some of the great things that are in the Victor catalogue but not in record stores.

CONTRIBUTORS

KATE L. MITCHELL is co-editor of *Amerasia* and author of "India Without Fable" and "Industrialization of the Western Pacific."

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Letters to the Editors

Two Noble Figures

Dear Sirs: Revelations are now being published by various newspapers about the plot to kill my son Carlo Rosselli, a plot of which my younger son, Nello, was also a victim.

The existence of the plot between Cagoulards and the Fascist regime in Italy was known in Paris in 1938, when the principal executors of the crime were discovered and arrested and a legal inquiry was made. But for political reasons the trial did not take place. When Paris fell to the Germans in 1940, the Cagoulards who had been arrested were set free. One of them, probably their leader, a certain André Tenaille who had fallen on the Russian front, was awarded the Légion d'Honneur by Pétain himself. Another of the murderers had taken refuge in Italy before the war, and Mussolini's government had refused to extradite him. During the legal inquiry an effort was made to steal the dossier of the inquiry from the judge in charge of it. The attempt failed, and the newspapers published the news of it.

It is strange that certain publications have recently tried to absolve Mussolini by putting all the guilt for the organization of the crime upon Ciano alone. One has to be quite ignorant of the methods of Mussolini's dictatorship to believe that Mussolini was kept in the dark about what was being plotted against Carlo Rosselli. The same methods were followed in the Matteotti murder to keep Mussolini out of the picture.

Carlo Rosselli was Mussolini's number-one enemy. He gave him no rest in his newspaper *Giustizia e Libertà*, published in Paris and circulated in Italy by underground channels and the movement called Guistizia e Libertà, which kept the Special Tribunal so busy condemning its members to the severest punishment. But Mussolini's rage reached a climax at the time of the Spanish civil war when Carlo Rosselli proclaimed that the moment had come for Italian anti-Fascists to fight fascism with arms in their hands. "Today in Spain, tomorrow in Italy" was his war cry. He organized the first group of Italian anti-Fascists and fought at their head in Spain for the Republicans.

Mussolini's personal hatred of my son reached full measure when Carlo revealed in his paper the disastrous defeat of the Italian Fascists at Guadalajara. He published photographs and names of Fascists made prisoner there and sent the mail of prisoners to their families in Italy with appropriate comments. Mussolini was doing everything possible to keep the Italians from hearing of the defeat. Gaetano Salvemini, in his book on Carlo and Nello Rosselli, published in 1937, of which a reprint will come out soon, affirms that Carlo Rosselli with the revelation of the truth about Guadalajara signed his own doom. When Mr. Matthews in one of his dispatches to the New York *Times* says he does not understand why Carlo Rosselli was chosen as a victim rather than others who were also leading anti-Fascists in Paris, he shows his ignorance of these facts. And this in spite of his mentioning, in other dispatches, some of Carlo's far-reaching anti-Fascist activities. Evidently Mr. Matthews knows nothing of the uninterrupted and tireless activity of this sworn enemy of Mussolini's regime.

By a cruel fate Nello, my other son, was with his brother at Bagnoles-de-l'Orne on the fateful day, making one of his rare visits. Nello had already endured prison and the concentration camp in Italy for his unshakable anti-fascism. He had wished to remain in Italy in order to give an example, such as many others gave, of firmness and dignity under the daily menace. Without taking such an active part in politics as his brother, he fulfilled his moral mission and Mussolini feared him. They were two noble figures and fate gave them the same end.

AMELIA ROSSELLI

Larchmont, N. Y., October 13

Germans and Nazis

Dear Sirs: Some weeks ago you expressed surprise that the German underground does not "equate" sentiment with physical resistance as the French *maquis* and the Slovaks have done, and you ask, as Argus did in the same issue, why the lower ranks of the army do not surrender as readily as their hopeless situation would prompt them to do. You and Argus are no doubt correct in assuming that the menace of the S.S. and the Gestapo is not a sufficient reason for the inactivity of the German underground and the continued fighting of the German soldiers. There is another reason, however, which you fail to see: the underground movements in the occupied countries have one great incentive for their activities, namely, the promise of a better future, while the anti-Nazis in Germany very likely lack this incentive. It is probable that they

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Cross-Word Puzzle No. 93

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Little ones have big ears
5 Where girls wear their stockings most (two words, 2 and 4)
10 Comparatively late
11 Buoyant but distasteful (two words, 4 and 5)
12 "Well of English undefiled"
13 Tips end in settled pay
14 Tithepayers' obligations
15 You can get her a net in an Iranian town
18 Anglo-Saxon poet from Macedon
21 "This cordial julep here, That flames and dances in his crystal - - - - - -" (Milton)
24 He is not serious, though his gun is in evidence
26 Signor Vespucci
27 The answer to 10 is your clue
28 Chickens and curses come home to this
29 Laugh at
30 Oh, poetry—as regards the pronunciation

DOWN

1 "Turn him to any cause of - - - - - -, The Gordian knot of it he will unloose" (*King Henry V*)
2 Of people who put their heads together (hyphen, 4-1-4)
3 Chariot (anag.)
4 Haunts where sorters may be found
6 Someone once said that they knew the price of everything and the value of nothing (two words, 3 and 4)
7 Between ourselves, this is - - - - - *nous*
8 Red tints are harsh
9 Small room, and very stuffy before tea
16 Light opera in which eight baronets are represented by their ghosts
17 The knuckle-end of England
19 Has this girl communistic tendencies?
20 "Kind hearts are more than coronets, And simple faith than - - - - - - blood" (Tennyson)
21 He prefers to eat in other people's houses
22 Dig up
23 Verse produced by an American writer with an effort
25 Bury in the heart of the interior

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 92

ACROSS:—1 FRENCHMAN; 6 CRASH; 9 CHAPMAN; 10 ADULLAM; 11 UPSURGE; 12 LAMP OIL; 13 THY; 15 UNSEAT; 17 ENTRAP; 18 OGLER; 19 DEMISE; 22 ASHORE; 25 ESS; 27 REYNARD; 28 EXCLUDE; 30 ARIZONA; 31 CONCERT; 32 DRESS; 33 DEPOSITOR.

DOWN:—1 FICHU; 2 ELAPSES; 3 CAMBRIA; 4 MINUET; 5 NEARLY; 6 CLUBMAN; 7 ALL FOUR; 8 HUMBLE PIE; 14 HILLS; 15 UNDERHAND; 16 TOE; 17 ERA; 20 MAYTIME; 21 SEASONS; 23 SECONDS; 24 OPULENT; 25 EDWARD; 26 SEA-CAP; 29 ENTER.

are not only without hope for a better future but actually fear that their suffering will not come to an end with the arrival of the victors. If they hear of the recent decisions of the UNRRA, if they hear what our news commentators are saying, they may feel that their fears are not unfounded.

You regretfully note that the democratic German revolution will not take the form of a "refusal of the German people to commit mass suicide" by resisting the Nazis, by desertions and surrender. How can you be sure that surrender, your alternative to mass suicide, does not mean mass suicide to them? What have we done to assure a tolerable future to the potential revolutionaries in Germany and to those Germans who resisted the Nazis before we did and who suffered from the Nazis before their neighbors did? We are distorting history and disregarding obvious psychological facts in order to justify our intention of dealing with the German people as if they were all Nazis.

KARL F. MUENZINGER

Boulder, Colo., November 15

Letters of Van Loon

Dear Sirs: People are continually asking me, "When are you going to publish a collection of your husband's letters?" And then they frequently add, "I have one he wrote me in 19— which certainly should be included."

I intend to publish a collection of his letters as soon as I can get one together. And so I am making this appeal to all the many friends of Hendrik Willem van Loon who have received and kept letters from him to lend them to me for the purposes of this book.

Please send them or copies of them to me at my home, Nieuw Veere, Old Greenwich, Connecticut. I will take great care of them and return them all as soon as possible to the owners.

HELEN VAN LOON
(Mrs. Hendrick Willem van Loon)

Old Greenwich, Conn., November 15

One Man's Poll

Dear Sirs: Speaking of polls, my column, The World Goes On, in the Aberdeen, Mississippi, *Examiner,* predicted forty-seven states right, missing only Ohio. It has only missed two states in three elections. Of course, I read the right periodicals!

Aberdeen, Miss., November 24

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